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I 
 
Summary 
The intention with this study is to contribute to the field of research that looks at the impact of 
ethnic divergence in a country. More specifically, I investigate social cooperation in an ethnic 
diversified society by mainly analyzing how people contribute to the funding of public goods 
through an economic experiment. By doing this, I want to be able to answer if “ethnicity 
matter for normal people in non-political times?”  
In the analyses, I have tried to invoke a co-ethnic bias in behavior both by letting players play 
identified games, where I changed the ethnic composition of the other group members, and by 
use of priming, intended to make different social categories more salient. The results shows 
that I do not find that people contribute more to the funding of public goods in a homogenous 
co-ethnic setting than in a mixed ethnic setting or that people is significantly affected by the 
treatment primes. I do not find any evidence in this study that people have co-ethnic 
preferences and that there is a negative effect of ethnicity on peoples willingness to contribute 
to the funding of public goods. Somewhat surprisingly I find that people contributes less in all 
games when primed with national identity treatment prime. 
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1.0  Introduction 
This chapter presents the motivation behind the research. Furthermore, the research question 
is presented and limitations and assumption specified. In addition, I will give a short overview 
over the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Motivation 
I love travelling and during my visits to all parts of the world it always astonished me the big 
difference one finds between people, between rich and poor. Where some live in 
overwhelming luxury, others struggle from day to day to survive. In meeting with the locals, 
it always surprises me that those who have the least are the friendliest and seems the happiest 
independent of race or ethnic background.  
But happy alone does not accelerate a country’s economy. To reach UN Millennium goals 
cooperation and economic development are necessary in many parts of the world. To achieve 
economic development in a country there are many factors in play. A lot of research in recent 
year’s points to the fact that ethnic divergence is a factor to the inequality one finds in the 
world today and in many African countries, ethnic divisions are a major issue.  
Existing literature suggests that a high degree of ethnic division in a country is associated with 
slow economic growth (Easterly et al. 1997; Bates 1983), low public good provision (Alesina 
et al. 2005; Miguel et al. 2005), low quality legislators (Banarjee et al. 2009) and armed 
conflicts (Cederman et al. 2011). A key issue is therefore whether – and how- inter-group 
division can be rendered less salient to avoid the negative outcomes of ethnicity. 
Other research find in contrast that co-ethnic preferences are not universal (Whitt et al. 2007) 
and Glennerster et al. (2013) find that diversity does not necessary need to hinder collective 
actions.  
Concentrating on one country with a highly diversified population, Kenya, I want to look into 
how people cooperate by letting participants play different types of experimental games. The 
intention is that the results from this research can be a contribution to the field of research that 
looks at the impacts of ethnic divergence in a country. 
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1.2 Research question 
The study is part of a bigger research project that seeks to understand what exactly makes 
ethnic fractionalization a barrier to cooperation across ethnic lines1.  
 
The purpose of my study is to investigate social cooperation in an ethnic diverse society 
(Kenya) by mainly analyzing how people contribute to the funding of public goods. With 
access to a lot of data and information it has been a challenge to narrow down the purpose of 
the study to one concrete focus area that captures the essence of cooperation in a diversified 
ethnic setting. With this as a background my research question is: 
 
“Does ethnicity matter for normal people in non-political times?” 
 
With normal people I mean that the study is based on a representative sample of the 
population in Kenya. With non-political times I mean that the summer of 2012 when the 
experiment was conducted were still far away from Election Day and the start of campaigning 
towards the upcoming election in 2013, something existing literature suggest may reinforce 
ethnic tensions (Eifert et al. 2010; Posner 2005). 
 
To answer the research question I analyzed people’s contributions in three different public 
good games with different ethnic composition, an anonymous-, mixed- and homogenous 
game. In the anonymous game participants have no information about the others players. In 
the mixed game participants play with a co-ethnic and a non-co-ethnic and in the homogenous 
game, all participants are categorized as being co-ethnics. A person’s contribution level in the 
game is synonymous with this person’s willingness to cooperate with other.  I also look into 
findings from the dictator game to see if transfer in the dictator game somehow explain 
contribution level in the public good games. 
 
In addition to document cooperation in within-group (co-ethnics) and cross-group-interactions 
(non-co-ethnics) it is also interesting to test if the (potential) differences one finds is subject to 
                                                          
1 By making participants play different types of economic games, isolating different 
mechanisms, the research will attempt to answer whether or not ethnic fractionalization  arise 
from innate cultural differences or if they are shaped by the surrounding political 
environment. This will be done by comparing data collected at different times both from 
Kenya and Tanzania. 
3 
 
experimental manipulation by finding out if the differences can be dampened or intensified by 
priming subjects with different social identities. A key issue is therefore on whether – and 
how – inter group division can be rendered less salient. Investigating the impact of different 
social category norms through priming, and how it affects cooperation in an ethnic diverse 
society is new and may give valuable information about the problems associated with 
ethnicity. The point by including priming to the analyses also is to try to elicit ethnic bias in 
cooperation in different ways; both by varying the ethnic identity of the groups the 
participants play against, and by priming. 
The analyses is divided in three parts. In the first part, I concentrate on how people in the 
control group contribute to the funding of the public good across games. In the second part, I 
look for possible explanations for the result in the first part by including beliefs of others 
contribution in the analysis as well as results from the Dictator game. Finally, in the third part 
I introduce the different treatments and see how priming affects people’s choice to cooperate. 
 
1.3 Limitations and assumptions 
The experiment was conducted as a field experiment with a total of 608 participants. Data 
from the experiment was collected and analyzed through statistical methods. The experiment 
was conducted at a certain point in time, July/August 2012. One can therefore expect that 
changes may occur or develop over time, especially related to the political climate in the 
country. The study takes this into consideration by including “non-political” times in the 
research question. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The study consists of 14 chapters. In chapter 1, I present my motivation for choice of topic. 
The research question is presented and limitations and assumption specified. In addition, I 
give a short overview over the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I present ethnicity as 
phenomenon and relate ethnicity to the African context before I review literature on the field. 
Chapter 3 introduces the country of interest, Kenya, from colonial time to present day. In 
Chapter 4, I present the public good model and discuss how taxation can be a solution to 
provide a sufficient level of public goods in a country. Chapter 5 presents the purpose of the 
study, the choice of research method and introduces how the different treatments was inserted 
in the games. Chapter 6 presents the economic experiment, all the way from data collection 
to data validity. In Chapter 7, the results for the control group in the public good games is 
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presented and discussed. Chapter 8 provides possible explanations for the results found in 
chapter 7 based on further econometric analysis by looking at beliefs of others contribution 
and findings from the dictator game. In chapter 9, I include priming in the analysis and look 
at how priming individuals with different salient category norms affects people’s behavior in 
the public good games. Chapter 10 presents and discusses the main findings from the 
research. Chapter 11 concludes on the findings and Chapter 12 discusses the implications 
from the research. 
The paper ends with a bibliography in Chapter 13 and appendices in Chapter 14. The 
chapter consists of 12 appendices, where appendix 14.1 to 14.11 contains supplementary 
information related to the results from part I, II and III. The last appendix, appendix14.12 
contain the “Stata do-file” used to produce the results.  
2.0  Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I present ethnicity as phenomenon and it`s development as a concept. Then I 
look specifically at ethnicity in Africa before I review current literature on the field. As I see 
it, cooperation is dependent of a non-hostile climate between ethnic groups. I will therefore 
also focus a lot on ethnic conflicts in this chapter.  
2.1 Ethnicity 
Throughout the world, there has been an increasing focus on the importance of ethnicity as an 
explaining factor to many of the ongoing conflicts and problems in the world today, from 
underdevelopment in African countries to issues relating sovereignty in Sri Lanka.           
Since the end of  Cold War the concept of ethnicity have gained more attention, particularly in 
conflict studies, and according to Eriksen (2002), this expansive coverage among social 
scientists in the 80s and 90s are related to an extensive interest in globalization and 
modernization (Eriksen 2002). According to the Center for Systematic Peace, the proportion 
of conflicts labeled as ethnic has increased from 15 percent in 1953 to nearly 60 percent in 
2005 (Stewart 2008), illustrating Eriksens` point above. And with a high level of ethnic 
conflicts it is reasonable to assume that cooperation between different ethnic groups also will 
be affected. 
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2.2 Theory 
There exist numerous different definitions concerning ethnicity and ethnic identification. In 
1922 the sociologist Max Weber wrote about ethnic groups in a novel way including in the 
definition a subjective element that previously had been absent, defining ethnic groups as; 
 “…those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of 
similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization 
and migration… furthermore it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship 
exists” (Weber cited in Swedberg 2005, p. 91).  
In his definition, Weber differentiates between racial and ethnic identity by suggesting that a 
blood relationship is not necessary for ethnic identification. The Norwegian social 
anthropologist Barth; claims that ethnic distinction is based on social interactions and mutual 
acceptance to persist, but in which he emphasizes the players own self-perceptions as the key 
for ethnic distinction (Barth 1969) and Eriksen (1993, p 12) defines an ethnic group as; 
 “…an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally 
distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular 
interaction.”  
As noted from the above definitions, group culture is now important in defining ethnicity and 
ethnic identity in contrast to earlier views where one often confused race and racial identity 
with ethnicity. Today there exists a clear distinction between these two concepts. Racial 
identity is which racial background you have that you most identify with, whereas ethnicity is 
more about the cultural aspects of a group. People from different races and nationalities can 
thus belong to the same ethnic group. For example, Maasaii people living in Kenya and 
Tanzania have different nationalities but share an ethnic identity. At the same time, people 
living in the same country may belong to different ethnic groups. A Kikuyu and a Maasaii, 
both from Kenya, will oppose to being classified as having the same ethnic identity.  
Another common division when defining ethnicity and ethnic identity is the distinction 
between an objective and subjective approach as noted in both Webers and Barths definition 
of ethnic identity. An objective perspective regards ethnic distinctions as an existing fact 
independent of the players' own knowledge and awareness. In contrast, the subjective 
approach to ethnicity emphasizes the shared sense of consciousness among a distinct group of 
people, which separates them from others (Eriksen 1993). Combining these perspectives one 
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can say that ethnicity is about attribution of characteristics, both from others and self. 
According to Eriksen (1993) the definitions of ethnicity as objective or subjective are 
important as they give an; “appreciation of systematic distinction between insiders and 
outsiders; between Us and Them” (Eriksen 1993, p. 18).  Moreover, he points to the fact that 
this distinction gives groups symbolic meaning (ibid). 
2.3 Africa 
Most African countries have a very diverse ethnic population. During colonial rule, borders 
were divided to serve the interests of the colonialists with no concerns for the people living 
there in the first place, and during this time the term ethnicity was not in use in African 
countries. Most of the politics and large social groupings were referred to as a tribe and this 
term was originally used to refer to a group of people who shared a common language, 
territory and custom.  Later, the term was extended to also include groups of people with 
well- organized hierarchical political system under the leadership of a chief or a king (Tonah 
2007).  
During the colonial era the colonialist needed chiefs to help them rule and Braathen (2000) 
argues that the colonialists appointed chiefs from a particular ethnic group to be rulers and 
gave them benefits over other ethnic groups. The chieftaincy institutions that were established 
by the chiefs were also based on ethnicity, making one ethnic group superior and the others 
inferior (Braathen 2000). As noted by Bayart (1993, p. 42);  
 “Tribalists think, more or less consciously, that men and women of their tribe and clan are 
superior to others, and that as a result the others should serve and obey them. The tribalist 
tries to impose the hegemony, the predominance of his tribe and his clan.” 
Although colonial rule has ended the majority of the borders introduced during colonialism 
still exist today, and ethnic division are still a major issue in many African countries. In 
Africa ethnic division are associated with slow economic growth (Easterly et.al 1997; Bates 
1983), low public goods provision (Alesina et al. 2005; Miguel et al. 2005), low quality 
legislators (Banjerjee et al. 2009) and conflicts (Cederman et al. 2011; Krebs 2007). Since 
1960s at least 5 million Africans have been killed in civil wars and internal strife. Many more 
have lost their homes and are living as refugees or in exile (Wamwere 2001). Several of the 
reasons behind these conflicts have been grounded on ethnic discrepancy. In Rwanda in 1994, 
over 800 000 tootsies, or 11 percent of the population were killed over a three month period 
supposed to end the country’s “tutsi problem” (ibid).  The symbolic element of ethnic identity 
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becomes even more evident in resources allocation. This is buttress by Bayart (1993) who 
argued that;”interaction of identity becomes the structure of power and allocation of power 
and resources” (Bayart 1993, p. 51).  
Ethnic identity therefore dictates who gets what, when and how in society. Ethnicity "is a 
means (now) for disadvantaged groups to claim a set of rights and privileges which the 
existing power structures have denied them" (Bell 1975, p.174) Based on this idea of 
ethnicity, ethnic conflict becomes inevitable. 
2.4 Conflicts  
The causes of ethnic conflicts are debated and most literature reviews on ethnic conflicts 
differentiate between two points of view: the natural on one side vs. the artificially or socially 
constructed on the other.  The primordial or natural approach at the one extreme takes ethnic 
identity as given at birth and relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic 
group (Brown 2001). Brown (2001) claims that although primordialism has been discredited 
in recent years it still plays a part in accounts of conflicts between ethnic groups. Former US 
president Bill Clinton argued that the end of the Cold War; “lifted the lid from a cauldron of 
long-simmering hatred. Now, the entire global terrain is bloody with such conflicts” (quoted 
in Brown 2001, p. 209).  
On the other extreme, one finds the instrumentalist approach, which views ethnicity as 
instrumental. One of the proponents of this view, Barth, argues that; “People act on the basis 
of ethnic categories only if they are perceived as useful [in the domain where the distinction is 
expected to give a return]“ (Barth 1969, p. 30).  
This approach first came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, where 
community leaders found that turning to their cultural group was more effective in search for 
political power and resources than turning to their social classes (Smith 2001). For proponents 
of this view “ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to 
particular ends” (Cornell et al. 1998, p. 61). In contrast to the primordial view, 
instrumentalists think that ethnic identification provides conditions rather than causes for 
conflicts and that ethnic difference alone is not sufficient to explain conflicts.  
The distinction between instrumentalism and primordialisme is perceived as a useful division 
because it highlights the duality of the concept of ethnicity; “ethnic organization must at the 
same time serve political goals and objectives and satisfy psychological needs about meaning 
and belonging” (Eriksen 2002, p. 54). 
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The quotation above illustrates very well the complexity of ethnic conflicts. In order for 
ethnic conflict to arise and exist the involved parties must primarily be aware of their ethnic 
identity and then feel that the causes of the conflict are rooted in ethnic discrepancy.  
 
2.5 Consequences of ethnic conflicts and rivalries 
Independent of school of thought it is commonly accepted among scholars that a high level of 
different ethnicities in a country may lead to sub-optimal policy. The awareness of the issues 
concerning ethnicity and ethnic identification in the last decades has brought ethnicity at the 
center of focus for many researchers aiming to identify causes behind the lack of development 
in Africa.  
On an overall level, Hameso (2001) argues that ethnic conflicts have dire consequences such 
as reducing planted areas, displacing person, hampering relief efforts and precluding 
economic reforms (Hameso 2001). In addition, he points to the fact that ethnic conflicts also 
have a negative brain drain effect and negative effects on educational and technological 
impacts in a country (ibid).  
Other research finds that Africa’s multi-ethnic environment is an important factor in 
explaining its low growth. From a macroperspective viewpoint Easterly et al., (1997) 
investigate the reasons behind Africa’s “growth tragedy”. In 1960 Africa’s growth potential 
was ranked ahead of East-Asia, but time has shown that were East-Asia has experienced 
enormous growth, average GDP did not grow in Africa in the period 1965-1990 (Easterly et 
al., 1997). Their thesis is based upon that ethnic diversity shapes policies that again shape 
economic growth and they find that ethnic diversity adversely affects many public policies 
associated with economic growth and that the fact that Africa is more fractionalized than East 
Asia can explain around 1/3 of the growth difference between these two continents. In sum, 
they show that ethnic diversity differences are important for explaining Africa’s growth 
tragedy versus Asia’s miracle (Easterly et al., 1997).  
Hjort (2011) on the other hand provides novel micro econometric evidence on the direct effect 
of ethnic division on productivity. His study is based on a flower plant production site in 
Kenya where the plant uses a randomly rotation process to assign workers to position. This 
leads to three types of teams: ethnically homogenous teams and teams in which one or both 
downstream workers belong to a tribe in rivalry to the upstream workers tribe.  
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Summarized, Hjort`s main finding (Hjort 2011, p. 1) is that; 
“..inter-ethnic rivalries lower allocative efficiency in the private sector, that the economic 
cost of ethnic diversity vary with the political environment, and that in high-cost environments 
firms are forced to adopt “second best” policies to limit discrimination distortions.” 
As in the private sector, ethnic conflicts and rivalries will make it more difficult to agree on 
public policies that are good for a country. Firstly, incumbent governments will not 
implement stabilization policy where the costs are today and the gains come in the future 
because they anticipate that they may not be in power to harvest the gains although the 
benefits goes to the population they are supposed to serve. Not surprisingly, the same 
mentality seem to apply for voters also. Investigating voter’s behavior in a simulated voting 
experiment in Uganda,  Carlson, et al. (2011) aim to figure out whether voters unambiguously 
vote for candidates of their own ethnicity or not. She finds that voters put equal weight on 
ethnicity and earlier performance of the candidate.  However, when they include an 
interaction effect between ethnicity and record they find that better performance among co-
ethnics increase the probability of winning. But for voters who are not of a candidates co-
ethnicity performance are of no importance. The implications is that co-ethnicity does not 
replace utility from a candidate`s quality, but also that a candidate cannot earn the votes of his 
non-co-ethnics by performing well. Together this indicates that voters will maximize their 
likelihood of future goods provision by voting ethnically (Carlson et al. 2011).  
A second point is that ethnic conflict may lead to uncoordinated corruption, which Schleifer  
et al. (1993) show are more harmful than centralized corruption, increasing the level and 
negative consequences of corruption in a country.  
Lastly, as will be the focus of this paper, ethnic discrepancy and contradictions, may make it 
more difficult to agree on public goods provision such as schools, health care, infrastructure 
and so on. Different priorities between different ethnic groups, all wanting to enrich 
themselves, does not provide a good environment for decision making harming the general 
population in a country. Miguel (2004) examines how central government nation-building 
policies affect interethnic cooperation by testing if ethnic diversity has an effect on local 
collective actions. He focuses on two neighboring countries with similar geography and 
histories, Kenya and Tanzania, and looks at contribution to the funding of public schools. He 
finds that the Tanzanians on average contribute more to the funding of public goods than the 
Kenyans and attributes this to the difference in nation-building policies. While the 
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government in Tanzania has pursued active nation-building policies like a national language 
and a common educational curriculum after independence, the Kenyan leaders have been 
tribalists and instead fostered competition along ethnic lines (Miguel 2004). He finds that 
parents in Kenya are less willing to participate in “community fund-raisers because of the 
lack of trust across ethnic groups and the absence of a feeling of ownership for the school” 
(Miguel 2004, p.359). 
Where Miguel investigate a direct link between ethnicity and contribution to the funding of 
public schools Habyarimana, et al. (2007) try to identify the underlying mechanisms that drive 
the connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the under provision of public goods. The 
aim is to understand why some communities are able to generate high levels of public goods 
whereas others are not. A major implication of their findings is that generating higher levels 
of public goods provision in diverse communities does not necessarily require the segregation 
of ethnic groups. Indeed, they find that just the opposite are needed; policies that promote 
repeated social interactions and the free flow of information across ethnic lines (Habyarimana 
et al. 2007).  
Most of these examples illustrate that it appears to be a clear negative effect of ethnicity in 
Africa. The same people affected by the negative outcomes of ethnic discrepancy and 
contradictions are the same people that contribute to maintaining the attitudes and thus the 
negative effects, due to their behavior. As this chapter has shown, issues revolving around 
ethnicity are complex. The concept of ethnicity can take on different meanings and be 
understood in different ways depending on the school of thought. The social climate also 
affects how ethnicity is perceived and experienced. Ethnicity can be emphasized or under-
communicated, be associated with joy or disgust and be imposed or denied depending on the 
situation and context where ethnicity is experienced. 
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3.0 Case Study 
In this chapter I present the country of interest in this study, Kenya. During 50 years of 
independence Kenya has experienced internal as well as external challenges. Giving a short 
overview of the main events in Kenya  provides an insight into some of the problems the 
country has faced and still struggles with and gives an understanding of the issues associated 
with ethnicity today. I end the section with a short overview over Kenya’s ethnography today.  
3. 1 Kenya 
The Republic of Kenya is located in eastern Africa populating around 43 million people (CIA 
2013). Throughout the last century, Kenya has gone from being a colony of the United 
Kingdom to become an independent African state. The transformation to a well-functioning 
democracy with a stable economic development has not been easy and Kenya is today still 
facing many challenges. It is estimated that roughly 50% of the population live below the 
poverty line, the unemployment rate is as high as 40% and 13% of the population aged above 
15 suffer from illiteracy (CIA 2013). In addition, corruption at all levels in society is a 
widespread problem and ethnic conflicts between different groups occasionally lead to violent 
clashes. 
3.2 Colonial time 
Based on commercial interests Britain formed in 1895 the British East African Protectorate, 
remaining a protectorate until 1920 when Kenya officially became an English colony 
(Anderson 2006). During the first period of British rule the British targeted at bringing Kenya 
under the imperial rule and improve the country`s condition by bettering the welfare of the 
population and developing the economy.  Instead, white settlement in the region lead to 
massive exploitation of the native population and racial- discrimination and dominance. The 
natives lost many of their rights, among them the right to participate in national politics. 
African political participation was confined to local government only and thereby they had no 
real impact on national issues concerning themselves (Anderson 2006). 
In the second period of colonial rule, from 1920 until independence African resistance against 
the imperial rule accelerated (BBC, 2013). The punitive and suppressive economic, social and 
political policies implemented by the imperialist`s provoked a growing resentment among the 
Kenyan population which led to the formation of the Kikuyu association in 1921 to fight for 
the rights of the Africans. The regime managed for many years to suppress and maintain 
control over the rebels, but after the Second World War resistance and violence towards white 
12 
 
settler´s increased (ibid). The Kenyan African Union (KAU) formed in 1944 to campaign for 
African independence. In the 1950s, a secret Kikuyu guerilla group known as Mau Mau began 
violent campaigns against white settlers. At the same time the labor movement began 
protesting against the harsh conditions the workers were working under and a state of 
emergency was declared in October 1952. Following the riots, KAU was banned and Jomo 
Kenyatta who became KAU leader in 1947 was charged with management of Mau Mau and 
jailed. After thousands being brutally massacred the rebellions were put down in 1956, but the 
state of emergency lasted until 1960. The same year Britain announced plans to prepare 
Kenya for majority rule. Jomo Kenyatta was freed in 1961 and the 12 of December 1963 
Kenya attained their independence and Kenyatta became Kenya`s first prime minister. The 
following year the Republic of Kenya was formed with Kenyatta as president and Oginga 
Odinga as vice-president (ibid).  
3.2 Post-colonization 
After independence Kenya African National Union (KANU) became Kenya`s dominant 
political party and Jomo Kenyatta stayed as president until his death in 1978 (Hornsby 2013). 
His first vice-president Odinga which were a Luo left KANU in 1966 forming Kenya 
People´s Union (KPU), a socialist rival party. In the years that followed tension between the 
two parties and their different ethnic groups escalated and the assassination of government 
minister Tom Mboya in 1969 sparked ethnic unrest (ibid). After KPU supporters attacked a 
Kenyatta entourage at the opening of a hospital later that same year KPU were banned and 
Odinga arrested (BBC 2013). KANU then became the only party to contest election. When 
Kenyatta died in 1978 he was succeeded by his vice-president Daniel arap Moi. He made 
KANU the sole legal party and in 1982 Kenya was officially declared a one-party state by 
National Assembly. Opposition groups were suppressed and imprisoned. However, attempts 
to form an opposition to Moi continued through the 80s and challengers made progress 
because of the country´s economic crisis. The international community openly criticized the 
political arrests and human rights abuses and Moi succumbed to the pressure and released 
political prisoners in 1989 (BBC 2013; Hornsby 2013).  
Violent unrest marked the beginning of the 1990s, and the opposition accused the government 
of corruption. In the wake of the unrest the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) 
party was established (BBC 2013). The party was outlawed and the members were arrested. 
Foreign governments who contributed financial assistance to Kenya suspended aid and 
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demanded political reforms and in late 1991 KANU agreed to introduce a multi-party political 
system. The new parties that emerged were essentially divided along ethnic lines, as the 
majority of the leadership and members came from one or two ethnic groups. Moi and KANU 
exploited internal contradictions between the new parties and used state funds to weaken and 
divide the opposition by infiltrating the parties to create destabilization and dissatisfaction 
among their supporters. In addition, in both the 1992 and 1997 elections restrictions on 
opposition leaders' freedom of movement were imposed, so they could not visit all parts of the 
country (ibid).  
In Kenya as in other fractionalized countries politicians are known to rely on ethnicity to 
perpetuate their dominance and hegemony in an atmosphere characterized by scarce 
resources, fear and prejudice. In the build-up of the 1992 elections, the contradictions between 
different ethnic groups led to tribal conflicts in the west of the country, which led to the 
killings of approximately 2,000, leaving many thousands more injured and even more people 
displaced from their homes. The economic consequences of the clashes were enormous as 
granaries, farms and shops went down in flames and food shortage was one of the far reaching 
economic consequences of the clashes making people dependent on international food aid and 
relief (ibid).  
The violence in and between the different parties made the ethnically fractured opposition fail 
to dislodge KANU from power in the 92 elections. However, dissatisfaction with Kenya`s 
social and economic situation among most of the Kenyan population grew and in the build-up 
to the 97 elections the civil society conducted demonstrations throughout the country calling 
for democratic reforms and demanding constitutional changes reducing power of the president 
(Hornsby 2013). In the capital Nairobi, the demonstrations violent turn down by the regime 
was filmed and broadcasted by CNN, which led to unwanted publicity for the regime (BBC, 
2013). Following the demonstrations and the associated killing of 20-25 demonstrators, the 
World Bank withheld disbursement of $5bn in structural adjustment credit (ibid). 
For the first time since the legalizing of the opposition in 1992 this development led Moi and 
KANU on the defensive and the regime had to give in to the demands of certain constitutional 
changes ahead of the 1997 election (BBC 2013). These changes were however of limited 
character and fundamental questions such as reduction of the power of the president were put 
aside until after the election. 
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Moi and KANU won the election with 40% of the votes (BBC 2013). The requirements for 
constitutional changes, however, continued, and Moi were forced to create a commission to 
look into the possibility of a revision of the constitution. The Commission proposed a sharp 
reduction in the president's power, coupled with a strengthening of other state bodies, 
especially the Parliament. The hope was that this would lead to a more genuine democracy, 
but the Moi regime was not willing to give in to the demands. 
The opposition continued to pressure the regime and in the 2002 election the opposition 
surprised everyone by standing together as one unit, and National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) 
and Mwai Kibaki, won a landslide victory ending Daniel arap Moi´s 24-year rule and 
KANU`s four decades in power (ibid).  
3.3 Last decade 
The beginning of this century has shown that Kenya`s economy has been progressing mainly 
because of expansions in tourism, telecommunication, transport and construction and a 
recovery in agriculture (CIA 2013). However, despite the fact that Kenya is the biggest and 
most advanced economy in east and central Africa, the country still faces many problems and 
is reckoned as a poor developing country. The Human Development Index, a combined 
statistic measure that indicates how well a country performs in life expectancy, education, and 
income put Kenya at rank 145 out of 186 countries (Human Development Report 2013). The 
last ten years have been characterized by internal problems such as corruption, ethnic clashes 
over land resources, food shortages due to droughts and flooding and dissatisfaction with the 
countries leadership and the writing and approval of a new constitution as well as external 
problem with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab (BBC 2013).   
The disputed 2007 December election led to violent clashes between different ethnic groups, 
mainly Kikuyus and Luos, and the killings of approximately 2000 people. International 
attention and excitement toward the 2013 election, the first one held under the new 
constitution, was therefore huge. Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, got the majority of 
votes and was elected Kenya’s new prime minister. The election did cause political tension 
rooted in ethnic discrepancy but the chaotic and violent ethnic clashes following the 2007 
election were avoided (The Economist 2013). Yet, the country remains badly split, largely 
along ethnic lines. The years to come will show how far Kenya has come in their democratic 
processes.  
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3.4 Kenya`s ethnography  
To be able to understand Kenya`s history [and the challenges the country faces today] one 
must understand the people of the country. With over 42 different ethnic groups, Kenya is one 
of the most fractionalized countries in the world. The African people indigenous to Kenya, 
who form 98% of the total population falls into three major cultural and linguistic groups, the 
Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic. Although Cushitic and Nilotic peoples occupy most of the land 
area, over 70% of the population is Bantu (Nangulu 2013). These groups are again divided 
into many more subgroups, each with a distinct history based on migration, evolution of the 
group, interaction with others groups, culture and social and political set-up (ibid). No 
particular ethnic group forms overall majority. The Kikuyu people, who account for around 
22%, forms the largest single ethnic group in Kenya and have played a major role in the 
nation`s political and social development. The estimated proportions of other major and 
influential groups are Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, 
other Africans 15% and non- Africans 1% (CIA 2013). 
Despite the above classification of the different ethnic group’s it´s hard to speak of a “pure” 
ethnic group in Kenya. Over the years, the groups have interacted through marriage, trade, 
association, assimilation, education, politics and new settlement patterns (Nangulu 2013).  
Ethnicity is however still maintained as a form of identity and belonging and as the review of 
the country’s history shows it is very clear that ethnicity has played a very important role in 
the political arena in Kenya.  
4.0 Public Goods 
In this chapter I will address public goods. This research attempts to answer if ethnicity 
affects normal people in non-political times. To be able to answer this question I focus on 
social cooperation in an ethnic diversified population by looking at how people contribute to 
the funding of public goods. Public goods are central for the research and it is therefore 
natural to use some time and space explaining what a public good is, the complexity with 
public goods and how the society normally deals with financing of these goods.  
4.1 Theory 
Public goods are goods or services that can be consumed by several individuals 
simultaneously without diminishing the value of consumption to any of the individuals 
(Pindyck et al. 2005). This key characteristic of public goods is termed non-rivalry and 
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implies that the additional marginal cost of serving another user is zero and is what most 
strongly distinguishes public goods from private goods. A pure public good is also 
characterized by its non-excludability, that is, a good cannot be withheld from those who do 
not pay for it without expensive precautions (ibid). Examples of such public goods or services 
includes fresh air, national defense, stabile social conditions, law enforcement, parks and 
other goods that benefit the whole population.  
 
However, the non-excludability characteristic of public goods gives people incentive not to 
contribute to the funding of these goods and instead free ride on other peoples contributions as 
they cannot be excluded from the usage of the good, i.e., they do not pay for the benefits they 
receive from consuming the public good. The consequences of people free riding are that 
these goods normally will be under-supplied in the market since private firms cannot earn 
sufficient revenues from providing the social optimally level of these goods (Pindyck et al. 
2005). Below I show a model which illustrate this issue.  
4.2 Model 
 
D1: demand of individual 1 for public good Q 
D2: demand of individual 2 for public good Q  
 
D1+D2: aggregated demand for individual 1 
and individual 2 for public good Q 
 
Q: quantity of the public good 
P: price for the public good 
MC: marginal cost of providing the public 
good Q 
 
 
As seen from the model above, the aggregated demand in the economy for a public good is 
the vertical sum of individual demand curves and is summed vertically because all individuals 
have the same opportunity to consume the quantity provided due to the non-excludability 
condition. In the short term the equilibrium price for private goods are equal to the marginal 
cost.  
Figure 1. Illustration of the provision of public goods. 
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But in contrast to private goods, the market price is no longer an efficient mechanism for 
public goods since the stock of public goods is never consumed away.  If the equilibrium 
price for the public good in question was P = MC then individual 1 would not pay for the 
public good. Individual 2 would only pay for Q2. Since Q2 < Q* the efficient level of the 
public good will not be met. 
 
A suggested solution to this problem is to provide Q* and then charge each consumer a unit 
price equal to the individuals marginal value at Q*. For individual 1 that would be P1* and 
for individual 2, P2*. The high demand individual, individual 2, will pay a larger amount than 
individual 1 who has a lower willingness to pay for the good. The problem with this is that for 
a given quantity, individuals will always wish to pay the lowest price possible and therefore 
not self-select to their optimal price since they cannot be excluded from consuming the good 
anyway, showing that unlike price, quantity is not an effective market mechanism and the 
reason for why inefficiency arises in providing public goods.  
 
To summarize the main problem concerning public goods is the non-excludability condition. 
Since no one can be excluded from using the good people have incentive to wait for others to 
purchase the public good so that they can free ride. Due to this imperfection there hardly ever 
exist any private markets for such goods, since no one is willing to purchase it. If however 
individual 2 decide to purchase it, the private market will provide a level of the public good 
equal to Q2, which is much lower than the social optimal level, Q*. 
 
4.3 Provision of public goods 
Deciding the extent of public goods is difficult when people have different preferences for 
diverse public goods. A general rule is that as long as the consumer surplus exceeds the total 
cost of providing the public good the good should be provided. In cases where this condition 
is not met, the good should not be provided. The question that arises then is how one can find 
peoples willingness to pay for public goods when it does not exists any market or price for 
these good? As social stable conditions and fresh air among other public goods are considered 
as necessities for most people in the society, provision of public goods requires collective 
actions in lack of a private market. The solution is that the government should provide these 
services, financed mainly through collection of taxes. The supply is therefore not decided by 
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the individual consumer but by the society as a whole. But tax incomes and thus the level of 
provision of different public goods is dependent on the tax level and effectiveness of the 
taxation system in each country. Where rich western countries have developed well-
functioned system for tax collection as well as good control practices the same efficiency is 
lacking in most developing countries. In addition, a high level of corruption in many 
developing countries is a widespread phenomenon, which in many cases will further lower tax 
incomes. According to International Monetary Foundation (IMF) a minimum tax level of 15 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is necessary to secure funding of basic government 
tasks such as law and order, education and health (Bistandsaktuelt 2010). A challenge for 
poor countries is to tax more of the population and businesses. In the rich OECD countries tax 
incomes accounts for 36 percent of the GDP whereas in low-income countries this number is 
as low as 13 percent creating a huge development gap between the developed and 
underdeveloped parts of the world. Rural areas in poor developing countries is especially 
affected as they often receive a lower part of state subsides than more urban areas, which in 
turn leads to people in the countryside being more dependent on cooperation and local fund 
raising to fund public goods such as for examples schools and water wells.  
4.4 Summary   
In a setting with mixed ethnicities, both Kenya’s history and current literature on the field 
show that there exist contradictions and attitudes that prevents cooperation across ethnic lines, 
and it is not unlikely that the problem with people free riding may be greater in an ethnic 
diversified society than in a more homogenous environment. People may place less weight on 
the utility of non-co-ethnics and have less altruism for people from other ethnic groups. In 
addition, coordination across ethnic groups may be more difficult than coordination within an 
ethnic group due to different languages, cultural practices and so on, which in turn also affects 
both their will and possibility to cooperate with others.  
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5.0 Methodology 
In this chapter, I present the choice of research design before I end the chapter with a review 
of the use of primes as treatments. 
5.1 Research design 
Johannessen et al. (2010) explains that the research design is about designing, where the 
researcher starts with the research question and considers the best possible way to implement 
the survey from start to finish. Punch (2005) points to the fact that the existing literature 
distinguishes between three uses of the term research design, ordered from general to specific. 
Central in all, the researcher must consider four question; what strategy to follow, within what 
framework, from whom to collect the data and finally how the data will be collected and 
analyzed. He explains that these four components of research design have the function of 
situating the researcher in the empirical world (ibid).  
The research design chosen for the study are a randomized experiment in form of a lab 
experiment. A randomized experiment is characterized by randomly assigning different 
subjects to research groups, where each group in turn is offered a different treatment (Bloom, 
cited in Alasuutari et al. 2008). Instead of relying on survey evidence, which makes causal 
inference problematic, I am with this approach able to identify any behavioral changes 
directly through standard laboratory games.  
The method was developed by Ronald A. Fisher during the early 1900s and was first widely 
used in the testing and development of new medicines. Since the 1960s the method has also 
been widely used in social research, from examining issues such as child nutrition to health 
insurance etc. (Bloom, cited in Alasuutari etal. 2008). Since the mid-90s, development 
economists have embraced experiments as a means for testing economic theories and 
hypotheses. According to Esther Duflo (2005) this trend started by a growing concern among 
researchers regarding the reliable identification of program effects in the face of complex and 
multiple channels of causality. In contrast to other methods, experiments make it possible to 
vary one factor at a time, and will therefore provide “internally” valid estimates of the causal 
effect (Duflo 2005). 
Such a set-up is characterized by being very specific in that the researcher tries to rule out 
alternative interpretations of the result. The aim of experimental design is to test causal 
hypotheses by demonstrating that the cause preceded the effect in time, that the two co-vary, 
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and that there are no alternative interpretations of why they vary other than that the cause was 
responsible for the effect (Shadish et al. 2001) 
The basic idea is that the groups should have similar baseline characteristics before the 
intervention for the randomization to work. The outcomes of the different groups after 
intervention, those who receive treatment and those who do not, the comparison groups, also 
called the control group or counterfactual, are then compared to see if the treatments have had 
any impact (Deaton 2010).   
Impact in experimental research can thus be defined as the difference in outcome between 
what was observed with the treatment and what would have been observed in the absence of 
the treatment (the counterfactual).  
Duflo (2008) says that one of the biggest advantages with experiments is that they can provide 
insight where observational approaches are not available. An observational approach will in 
this case be difficult to implement as well as it is unsuitable because of the potential bias for 
people to avoid revealing their true preferences because of the tense nature associated with 
ethnicity in Kenya. Performed properly a randomized experiment will enable us to make 
assumption about the causal effect by eliminating biases and enable measurement of 
uncertainty (Bloom, cited in Alasuutari et al. 2008). In addition, differences can be quantified 
and the study is easily replicable for others ensuring the studies validity (ibid). 
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5.2 Model 
 
Figure 2. Graphical illustration of how to implement field experiment. 
YTB = average for people in the treatment group before any intervention 
YCB = average for people in the control group before any intervention 
D = 1 means that person was treated 
D = 0 means not treated 
The basic idea in randomization is that the two groups in the experiment, the control group 
and the treated group, should have similar outcomes before the intervention:      
YTB(D=1) - YTC(D=0) = 0            YTB(D=1) = YTC(D=0) 
At baseline, if randomization has worked, the two groups will have similar outcomes. As the 
graph shows the treatment is then inserted to one of the groups.  
YTF = mean average for outcome Y for those in the treatment group after the treatment and 
they were treated 
YCF = average for the comparison group. What would have been the outcome if those in the 
treatment group had not received the treatment, counter to fact because it is never observed 
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The difference between YTF and YCF is the impact of the treatment inserted in the experiment: 
Impact = YTF(D=1) – YTC(D=0) 
The observed difference in outcome at follow up is due to the intervention because that is the 
only variable that is different between the two groups, given that outcomes are similar at 
baseline. 
5.3 Treatments 
In the experiment, the participants played different versions of the public good game and  
each game were in turn played with three different treatments- and a control group. This was 
done to elicit ethnic bias in cooperation in different ways; both by varying the ethnic identity 
of the groups the participants played against and by priming different social identities. 
Benjamin et al. (2009) explains that social identity prescribes people’s behavior and that it is 
possible to trigger people’s social identities, which is the intention behind the different 
treatments in this research. The method is called priming and has been a long-standing idea in 
“self-categorization theory” in psychology (James et al. cited in Benjamin 2009).  
Individuals in the experiment was randomly assigned to one of four groups: national priming, 
ethnic priming, political priming, or control group. The first treatment primes respondents 
with national identity. The second treatment primes respondents with ethnic identity and the 
last treatment primes respondent with political competition identity. The different treatments 
aims to trigger a certain behavior by reinforcing a certain mindset. In many cases one can say 
that priming may simulate individuals response to political messaging, new reports, 
advertising and son on.  
 “The theory says that environmental cues called “primes” can temporarily make a certain 
social category more salient, causing a person`s behavior to tilt more towards the norms 
associated with the salient category” (Benjamin et al. 2009, p. 3).  
He further explains that if the theory holds, researchers can identify the marginal effect of a 
particular social category by experimentally varying the salience of the category and seeing 
how an individual`s behavior changes (Benjamin et al. 2009). The purpose of the election of 
several treatments is to see how the different treatments in turn affect the participant’s choices 
in the public goods game. A benefit from choosing several treatments is that it is possible to 
compare the data with each other and look for similarities and differences between the 
outcomes of the treatments and between the treatments and the control group. 
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6.0 The Experiment 
In the following chapter I first explain how the data was collected and the procedure for the 
selection of respondents before I briefly describe the sample. Moreover, the preparation and 
conduct of the experiment are described and also how the data was processed and analyzed. I 
present the main expectations before I end the section with a thorough assessment of the 
quality of the method chosen in terms of data validity and data reliability.  
6.1 Data collection 
The research question greatly affects the choice of how to collect data (Johannessen et al. 
2010). The purpose of this study is to analyze if ethnicity affect normal people in non-political 
times by looking into how people contributes to the funding of public goods and to see 
whether or not priming the subjects with different social identities have an effect of peoples 
willingness to contribute to the group fund. To be able to make statistical inferences about 
peoples willingness to contribute to the funding of public goods and the impact of the 
different treatments it will be most appropriate to collect data through a randomized 
experiment.  
The project was conducted in collaboration with the The Busara Center for Behavioral 
Economics who used their social networks and community mobilizers to recruit participants. 
The recruiters knew the areas of interest well. They helped finding a space to rent for 
recruitment, spreading information before and during the recruitment and brought people to 
the desk for registration. At no time in the recruiting process did they mention ethnicity as the 
purpose for the study. At all times they followed a prewritten script that stated that the 
purpose of the study is to gain better understanding of how people make their economic 
decision to avoid triggering a certain behavior among the participants. In post-game debriefs 
interviews there was minimal awareness of the focus of the study and no one mentioned 
ethnicity as the reason behind the behind the public good games, indicating that the study was 
developed and conducted as intended2.  
To ensure people met up on the appointed day and time participants received a call-in one or 
two days in advance in addition to a reminder text message the day before. At the call-in 
                                                          
2 After the whole lab only a quarter believed ethnicity was the study’s focus, and almost 
always in relation to “Choose your Dictator”, the final game in the study, similar to the 
numbers mentioning age or education as the reason behind the study. Note that the “Choose 
your Dictator” game is not a part of this research. 
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participants also answered different background question on themselves to be used in the 
upcoming analysis. People were given an economic incentive of 50 Ksh for showing up on 
time. Late-comers were compensated, but would not be able to participate in the study and 
were thus missing out on the probability of extra earnings providing an extra incentive for 
showing up on time.   
The lab experiment was conducted over a relatively short period of time in July/August in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The collection of the research data was done in Busara research center in a 
quiet neighborhood not far from Kibera or downtown and was easy to reach by public 
transport making selection into attending the session not too bad. Participants typed their 
decision using touch-screen computers. Due to illiteracy among many participants, earphones 
were handed out and all instructions were given in Swahili through audio records. In addition, 
Kenyan staff was available at all time to clarify the set-up if needed.  
6.2 Sample selection 
Samples used in experimental trials should always try to mimic the population by being a 
miniature replica of the variation one finds in the population (Shadish et al. 2001). As the 
purpose of the study is to analyze if ethnicity affect normal people in non-political times by 
looking at how people in an ethnic diversified society cooperate the sampling and recruitment 
was stratified by ethnicity to be sure that the session and sample compositions would be 
similar to Nairobi`s ethnic composition, which mimics Kenya`s overall ethnic composition. 
To do so, the five largest ethnic groups in Kenya were selected, the Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, 
Luhya and Kisii. Total these five groups constitute 82 percent of the population in Nairobi, 
Kenya, illustrated by the column “Total” in the figure below. 
  
 
Figure 3. Ethnic composition in Nairobi, Kenya. 
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The target population among these ethnic groups consists of individuals living in informal 
settings and slum areas since as an economically disadvantaged population they tend to be the 
most dependent upon government public services and are most susceptible to politician 
strategies of vote buying and clientelism (World Bank Development Report 2004; Kramon 
2011).   
Busara`s subject pool composition from Kibera, the largest slum area in Nairobi, consisted 
mainly of Luo and Luhya, and were insufficient for the projects needs and the recruitment 
was therefore expanded to Viwandani to also get the Kikuyus and Kambas needed. 
Participants from Viwandani were given an extra economic incentive for showing up because 
of the long travel distance to the research center where the experiment took place.  
6.3 Study Sample 
The Busara lab subject pool consisted of over 2000 individuals in working class “slum” areas. 
The experiment collected a total of 608 (611) participants, where  62.03 percent came from 
the Kibera area and the remaining 37.97 percent came from the Viwandani area. Kibera is 
mainly Luo, Luhya and Kisii and Viwandani is mainly Kikuyu and Kamba. 
During July and Augsust 2012, 32 lab session were conducted with approximately 20 
participants in each. 26 subjects was however called in for each session to ensure that enough 
participants would turn up. Each session was designed to have a similar ethnic compostion 
and in order to emulate Kenya's ethnic division each session required in addition a minimum 
number of participants from each ethnic group. 
Participants was randomly assigned to one of four groups ending in this distribution: control 
group 150 individuals, treated with national identity prime 153 individuals, treated with ethnic 
identity prime 153 individuals and treated with political competition identity prime 152 
individuals. 
The anonymous public good game and the mixed public good game collected 608 
observations each whereas the homogenous game only collected observations from 598 
individuals.  
6.4 Public Good Games 
The thesis is that public good games captures an individual’s willingness to contribute to the 
group fund in order to make everybody better off. The assumption is that a person’s 
contribution level captures this person’s willingness to cooperate with others and his or hers 
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ability to overcome free riding. The game is constructed in such a way that participants must 
state how much they think others in their group will contribute to the funding of the public 
good before they make their own decision. The thesis is that subjects place greater weight on 
the utility of co-ethnics and have less trust in non-co-ethnics. Beliefs of others actions are 
important to understand this and can be an important factor in explaining own contribution 
and is therefore useful to include in the game set-up. 
6.4.1 General set-up 
Participants in the public goods games engaged in two sets of economic activities. The first 
set was anonymous. In this game participants were randomly paired with two other players 
and had no information about the individuals they were partnered with. The main outcome of 
interest here is how much an individual contributes to the group found in an anonymous 
setting. The second set of games was identified. Participants received some background 
information such as education, hometown and age about the participants they were partnered 
with. Each hometown chosen was characterized by a clear ethnic majority and was indirectly 
used as identifying the ethnicity of the other group members. The other characteristics, age 
and education was balanced across the profiles for each ethnic groups so that there on average 
are no confounders correlated with ethnicity. In the identified rounds participants played two 
different games. In the first identified game, the participants were in a mixed group with one 
co-ethnic and one non-co-ethnic profile. The main outcome of interest in this game is the 
amount an individual is willing to contribute in a mixed group. In second identified game, the 
final round of the public good games, individuals were in a group with only co-ethnics. The 
main outcome of interest in this game is the amount that an individual is willing to contribute 
in a homogenous group.  
Thus, exploiting the differences in the set-up of games (in the identified rounds) makes us 
able to see if there exist any differences in people’s behavior when interacting (cooperating) 
with co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics.  
In every game, individuals were given an endowment of 60 Ksh (approx. $0.7) and asked to 
state their beliefs about how much other groups members would contribute to the group fund. 
They were then asked how much they would contribute. Including beliefs of others 
contribution in the game set up makes it possible to reveal if people act in accordance with 
their own beliefs and is an important factor in explaining own contribution. By including 
beliefs of others contribution it is also possible to reveal if people deliberately choose to free 
ride on others.  
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Participants were informed that all contributions to the group fund would be added up and 
doubled by the researcher for then to be divided equally among the participants. Money that 
participants kept to themselves would not be added up but the participants would add them up 
to the other earnings made from the workshop. 
For example, if participant A contributed 0 Ksh to the group basket and put 60 Ksh to own 
private basket and participant B and C each put 30 Ksh to the group basket and 30 Ksh to his 
or her own private basket the total of 60 Ksh placed in the group fund would automatically 
double to 120 Ksh. The 120 Ksh would then be divided equally among all three participants, 
even though participant A did not contribute to the funding of the group fund. Participant A 
would in total receive 100 Ksh, 60 Ksh from own saving and 40 Ksh from the group fund.  
Participant B and C would only receive 70 Ksh each, 30 Ksh from own saving and 40 Ksh 
from the group fund. If, in contrast all players had contributed 60 Ksh to the group fund, the 
total amount to be divided equally had been 360 Ksh, resulting in a payout of 120 Ksh to each 
participant.  
This example illustrates that if everybody contributes to the funding of the public good 
everybody will benefit from it. However, public goods is as already mentioned characterized 
by being non-excludable and in such cases people will always have the incentive to free ride. 
Free riding and egocentric behavior such as participants A`s behavior in the first example 
above will always reduce the contribution to the public good, resulting in a lower provision of 
public goods. 
6.4.2 Co-ethnicity and Non-co-ethnicity 
The empirical strategy adopted in the research depends on the ability to distinguish 
interactions (cooperation) among co-ethnics from interactions among non-co-ethnics. A 
correct division of the different ethnic groups will therefore be crucial for a rightful 
interpretation of the results. There are five ethnic groups in the sample; Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, 
Kisii and Kamba. These ethnicities are grouped as being “co-ethnic” or “non-co-ethnic” by 
traditional alliances In the 2007 election the country’s six most numerous ethnic groups where 
divided by party, people belonging to the Kikuyus and Kambas supported Kibaki for 
president while Luos, Luhyas and Kalenjins voters were supporting Odinga for president. The 
Kisiis was the only major group with roughly equal vote shares for both candidates, although 
a majority voted for Odinga.  
Thus, the Kikuyu and Kamba are grouped together as co-ethnics and the Luo and Luhya are 
grouped together as co-ethnics. The Kisii have traditionally been neutral and are considered to 
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be non-co-ethnic to both ethnic groupings. In this study, they are assigned to Luo/Luhya 
sequence of treatment. In order to ensure that there were sufficient variations in partner 
backgrounds in the identified rounds to estimate the co-ethnic effect, it was created a set of 
background profiles from the initial sessions for respondents to be partnered with. This was 
also done to prevent potential resentment between participants within each session, about 
lower than expected transfers or contribution. In these identified rounds, respondent`s faced 
profiles from people of particular backgrounds. These profiles were randomly drawn from a 
set of profiles that contained information about education, age and hometown. Hometown 
allow for individuals to infer the profile participants ethnicity, since the hometowns selected 
have one dominant ethnicity. Thus, the identified public-good games captures how an 
individual`s willingness to contribute to the group fund varies according to other group 
members background profiles. 
6.5 Data analysis 
The randomized experiment produced a lot of data and I use STATA (data analysis and 
statistical software program) to analyze the data. I have divided the analysis in three parts. 
The main part focuses on contribution level in the different public good games which is my 
main focus area. Part two of the analysis tries to explain the findings from the first part and in 
this section I also incorporate some data from the dictator game in the analysis. Lastly, in the 
third part, I look at how priming affects individual behavior in the public good games. 
To be able to answer if ethnicity matter for normal people in non-political times I analyze the 
data by looking at how the independent variables, x, affects the dependent variable, y, in the 
public good games. When presenting the results from the randomized experiment I focus on 
linear regression estimates (OLS), using the player’s contribution as the outcome. The 
primary specification in the econometric analysis simply regress the dependent variable on the 
treatment dummies and the aim is to interpret the estimated multiple regression equation;  
yˆ = β0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 +...+βk xk, 
in terms of how changes in the different xjs affect the dependent variable y, holding all other 
(relevant) factors fixed.  
The regression specification have indicator variables Tk, k =1,2,3 for individuals belonging to 
their respective treatment group, national identity prime, ethnic identity prime and political 
competition prime respectively. 
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When using OLS there are certain assumptions that must be fulfilled (Wooldridge 2008). 
Below I list the 5 assumption of the multiple regression model that must be valid for the 
analysis to be correct, also called the Gauss- Markov assumptions. 
1: The population model can be stated as follows; yi = β0 +β1 x i1 +β2 xi2 +...+βk xik +ui, where 
β0, ..., βk are k +1 unknown population parameters, and u is an unobserved random error term. 
2: We have a random sample of size n, {(xi1,...,xik,yi) : i = 1, ..,n} 
3: No perfect collinearity: in the sample (and in the population), none of the independent 
variables are constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent 
variables.  
4: Zero conditional mean: E(u|x1,x2,...,xk) = 0, meaning that the model residuals (i.e., the 
over -and underpredictions) have a normal distribution with a mean of zero. 
5: Constant variance: Var(u|x1,x2,...,xk) = σi2.  
(Wooldridge 2008) 
If these assumptions are fulfilled the OLS estimators are BLUE (best linear unbiased 
estimators) meaning that the different tests I use in the analysis are valid and that it will be 
possible to generalize the regression results for the sample. From the collected data I find that 
the assumptions are met and using OLS to analyze the data would be appropriate.  
6.6 Control Variables  
As mentioned in the previous section the primary specification in the econometric analysis 
simply regress the dependent variables on the treatment dummies. In addition, I also estimate 
specifications where I use Xi as a vector of control variables. With multiple regression model 
and by adding more control variables one can explicitly control for other factors affecting y 
and it is more likely that the zero conditional mean assumption holds, and thus more likely 
that one are able to infer causality. Another advantage is that by controlling for more factors, 
one can explain more of the variation in y and thus make better predictions, and one can also 
incorporate more general functional forms (Wooldridge 2008). In the analysis I have chosen 
to look closer at different socio-economic categories. 
The vector Xi includes the following variables: 
 Gender 
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 Years of education (demeaned) 
 Age (demeaned) 
Concentrating on these variables, I can test if the data reveals any significant difference in 
behavior between men and females, between those with a different education level and 
between elder and young people.   
In the analyze, in addition to run different regressions, I will focus a lot on comparing mean 
contribution both internal and across games to see if I find that there are any differences, both 
between the socio economic variables in each game and also between the different public 
good games. However, analyzing mean contribution tells us only something about how people 
on average contribute to the group fund. I will therefore also look at the histograms to see if 
the distribution reveals any new information that the mean does not capture. 
6.7 Main expectations 
In this section, I present the main expectations for the experiment. Based on previous research 
on the impact of ethnic divergence I expect to find an overall negative effect of ethnicity on 
peoples willingness to contribute to the group fund in the public good game and that; 
 Individuals place greater weight on the utility of co-ethnics than on the utility of non-
co-ethnics. 
 
 Individuals are more generous towards co-ethnics and they contribute more to a 
homogenous co-ethnic group fund. The opposite holds for non-co-ethnic settings. 
 
 The socio-economic variables affect willingness to contribute to the group fund 
differently.  
 
 National priming will increase generosity and willingness to contribute to the group 
fund, both in the anonymous and in the identified rounds. 
 
 Ethnic priming and political competition priming will increase generosity and the 
willingness to contribute to the group fund in a co-ethnic setting. In a non-co-ethnic 
setting, the opposite holds. 
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6.8 Testing hypotheses  
To investigate if the main expectations are met I run different types of regression and I 
compare the mean both internal (socio-economic variables) and across the different games. 
When comparing the mean from the different games I see if there is a difference in 
participant’s contribution to the funding of the public good. This is done by testing different 
hypotheses.  
Testing hypotheses reveals if the difference in mean (both in- and between games) is 
statistically significant or not. According to Johannesen et al. (2010) significance testing 
means to investigate whether any differences between the sample (for example between those 
who have education level below median and those who have education level above median) 
can be generalized to include the population (Johannesen 2010), in other words, we test if the 
difference in mean from the sample can be generalized to be valid for the population.  
The principle behind this is to formulate a hypothesis, called the null hypotheses (H0), that 
there is no difference between the populations, and an alternative hypothesis (HA) that says 
that there is a difference, i.e. that the actual value of a population parameter is less than, 
greater than, or not equal to the value stated in the null hypothesis. 
In hypothesis testing, to make a decision, we conduct a study to test whether the null 
hypothesis is likely to be true. If H0 is rejected, than Ha is automatically accepted (Johannesen 
et al. 2010). The level of significance in hypothesis testing is the criterion we use to decide 
whether the value stated in the null hypothesis is likely to be true. The result is 
called statistically significant if it has been predicted as unlikely to have occurred 
by chance alone, according to a pre-determined threshold probability, the significance level. 
General, if the p-value is less than the significance level (α), the p-value is judged to be small 
enough to reject H0. Contrary, if the p-value is greater than α, H0 is not rejected (Wooldrigde 
2008).  
Since hypothesis testing is based solely on a sample and not an entire population it is possible 
that a conclusion may be wrong. There are especially two potential errors one must be aware 
of, type I error; rejecting a true null hypothesis and type II error; not rejecting a false null 
hypothesis. It is especially type I error one are most worried about and one should always 
choose a low significance level to avoid making this error. For the hypothesis tests in this 
research a 5 % significance level are statistically significant by chance, and I can also accept a 
10 % significance level.  
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In the following analysis I test if the differences I mean contribution in the public good games 
are statistically significant, both internal (the different social economic variables) in the 
different games and also across games. To do this I use analysis of variance (ANOVA) which 
is a collection of statistical models used to analyze the differences between group means. 
Anova assumes that all data are independent observation from the normal distribution. With 
analysis of variance the observed variance in a particular variable is partitioned into 
components attributable to different sources of variation (Johannesen et al. 2010). The 
problem that analysis of variance solves is to determine if the difference in group means do 
not differ more than random variation can explain (H0) or if  the difference is huge enough so 
that one can conclude that HA is true.  
For example, in the anonymous public good game Anova allows me to break up the group 
according to the socio-economic variables and then test if contribution is different across 
these variables (HA) of not (H0).  
6.9 Validity 
Validity is one of the main concerns with all research. In general, validity is an indication of 
how well the research has been conducted (Johannesen et al. 2010). Statistical conclusion 
validity is the degree to which conclusions about the relationship among variables based on 
the data are correct or “reasonable”, and validity in data collection means that your findings 
truly represent the phenomenon you are claiming to measure (Alasuutari et al. 2008). In 
statistical conclusion, validity involves ensuring the use of adequate sampling procedures, 
appropriate statistical tests, and reliable measurement procedures. With five different 
experimental games, three distinct priming treatments and multiple subgroups of interest, 
issues of data mining and inappropriately sized statistical tests are major concerns and must 
be dealt with appropriately. 
Validity can be divided in internal and external validity. Internal validity is according to 
Johannessen et al. (2010) about the extent to which the researcher procedures and findings 
correctly reflects the purpose of the study and represents reality. Internal validity is in this 
case about the degree to which conclusion about causal relationship can be made based on the 
measures used, the research setting and the whole research design.  
Internal validity is affected by flaws within the study itself, such as not controlling some of 
the major variables or problems with the research instrument. The aim of this study is to 
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investigate the impact of ethnicity on social cooperation and the game set-up have tried to 
isolate the effect on ethnicity in different ways, both by varying the composition of group 
members in the different public good games and by priming different aspect of social 
identities. This has been done to elicit ethnic bias in different way and to ensure the studies 
internal validity.  
External validity on the other hand concerns the extent to which the internally valid results 
can be generalized to a larger group or other contents (Alasuutari et al. 2008). Field 
experiments are often like lab experiments, criticized for lacking external validity (Duflo 
2005), i.e. it is not clear that the behavior observed in the experiment would apply when 
people make real decision outside the research setting. Another major factor is whether the 
research participants (e.g. study sample) mimic the general population along relevant 
dimensions. Exploring if ethnicity has an impact on normal people in non-political times it is 
crucial that the study sample is representative for the overall population. In the study 
participants were first only recruited from the Kibera area but the subject pool were expanded 
to also include people from the Viwandani area to get a representative sample, which included 
participants from the five largest ethnic groupings in Kenya.  
There are several others factors that can affect external validity among them, interaction 
among participants, experiment or researcher effect, and effect of the research environment 
(Alasuutari et al. 2008). Being aware of these factors in all phases of the experiments makes it 
easier to avoid and minimize these threats to external validity.  
6.10 Reliability  
According to Alasuutari et al. (2008) reliability addresses the consistency of the instrument’s 
measurement. That is, would the testing instrument used generate the same result in similar 
circumstances? In experimental research this means that other researchers should be able to 
perform exactly the same experiment under the same conditions and get the same result and 
come to the same conclusions. This strengthens the results and is a necessary factor for the 
overall validity of the experiment. A prerequisite is that the measures should be stable and/or 
repeatable. If the random error variation in the measurements is so large that the there is 
hardly no stability in the measures one cannot explain anything.  
In field experiments it is therefore essentially that participants understand the task they are set 
to do. One can never have a full guaranty that all participants act as in intended by the field 
experimenter but one can take certain precautions to limit potential deviations. In the 
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experiment participants was thoroughly explained the game set up and also given examples of 
how to do the task. In addition, there were people available in the lab at all times to clarify 
potentially problems and misunderstandings.  
To ensure the studies reliability it is also important to be open and share information about 
how the experiment was conducted and how the data was collected, as well as how the 
analysis was performed. Unfortunately, I did not have the possibility to participate in the 
execution of the experiment in Kenya and such the data collection, but both the procedure and 
how the data was collected have been very well documented before, under and after the 
implementation. I did also get the chance to talk to one of the field researcher, Ana Beatriz 
Aguilar Santos Borges, after she returned to Norway and got useful and complementary 
information about the experiment, challenges they faced and her experience. This made me 
convinced that the data had been collected as intended. In post-game debriefs interviews 
hardly any participants mentioned ethnicity as the purpose of the study and only one quarter 
believed ethnicity was the study’s focus, and almost always in relation to “Choose your 
Dictator”, the last game participants participated in, which is not included in this analysis.  
When analyzing data I have had an open mind and not manipulated any data to fit expectation 
and in the appendix one will find all commands I have used to produce the results presented in 
the paper. Thus it will be easy for others to replicate the study as well as controlling the 
results, increasing the reliability of the research.  
7.0 Experimental results, part I  
Before I start the analysis I will introduce the specification used for running the regressions in 
the public good games. Then I focus on presenting summary statistics for the three different 
games before I expand the analysis by looking closer at the socio-economic categories; 
gender, age and level of education. 
7.1 Public Good game 
The public good (PG) game is played in three different set-ups; an anonymous play, a mixed 
play and a homogenous play. As previously mentioned, the main outcome of interest in the 
anonymous PG game is how much an individual contributes to the group fund without any 
information about the other group members. For the mixed PG game the main outcome of 
interest is how much an individual contributes to the group fund in a mixed group, with one 
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co-ethnic and one non co-ethnic. Lastly, in the homogenous PG game the main outcome of 
interest is how much an individual contributes in a homogenous group, with only co-ethnics.  
Each game is played with one control group and three different treatments. Main focus in this 
section is on presenting results for the control group for the anonymous-, mixed- and 
homogenous game. I will come back to and discuss the treatments effects later in the paper. 
When presenting the results I focused on linear regression estimates (OLS), using the player’s 
contribution as the outcome. The primary specification in the econometric analysis simply 
regress the dependent variable on the treatment dummies.  
First specification:    
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 
Yi = pg_contribution       (in the anonymous PG game)  
Yi = pgidmix_contribution      (in the mixed PG game) 
Yi = pgidhom_contribution       (in the homogenous PG game) 
This specification takes the variable Yi, which is a given outcome for participant i, and 
regresses it on the treatment variables, i.e., Yi, captures an individual`s willingness to 
cooperate with others. Recall that T1 is the national treatment dummy, 
T2 is the ethnic treatment dummy and T3 is the political competition treatment dummy. As 
usual, ԑi is an idiosyncratic error term. In this part of the analysis I rule out the treatment 
dummies and concentrate only on the control group. 
In addition, I estimate specification where I use Xi as a vector of control variables.  
 
Second specification with control:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The vector Xi includes the following variables; gender, age and years of education 
(demeaned)  
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7.1.1 Contribution to the group fund 
The main outcome of interest in this section is how much people in the control group on 
average contribute to the group fund in the different games. Table 1 below presents mean 
contribution and is given in percent of how much an individual could possible contribute to 
the group fund. 
Table 1: Public good Game: Summary statistics for the control group 
    
 Anonymous Mixed  Homogenous 
Overall 47.89 49.94 48.08 
 (25.20) (27.26) (27.89) 
    
Female 48.95 50.21 49.47 
 (25.75) (29.57) (28.65) 
    
Male 46.71 49.65 46.53 
 (24.70) (24.66) (27.15) 
    
Age: 35 and under 46.86 48.98 47.25 
 (25.13) (27.21) (27.27) 
    
Age: over 35 50.38 52.27 50.08 
 (25.48) (27.57) (29.57) 
    
Below Median 
Education 
50.00 50.93 50.79 
 (25.04) (27.48) (29.87) 
    
Above Median 
Education 
46.36 49.23 46.11 
 (25.34) (27.25) (26.37) 
    
Observations 150 150 150 
Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses. Note: contribution level is given in percent. 
 
As seen from table 1, mean contribution for the variable “overall”, that is, all individuals in 
the control group, are pretty much similar across the different games. People in the 
anonymous game contribute on average 47.89 percent of their endowments, people in the 
mixed game contribute on average 49.94 percent of their endowments and for the 
homogenous game average contribution equals 48.08 percent.  Rounded upward these 
contributions approximately equal 50 percent, meaning that people in the control group on 
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average gives 30 Ksh to the group fund. Giving the game set-up explained in section 6.4.1 this 
leads to individual payments of approximately 90 Ksh in all games. On the contrary, if all 
three participants had fully cooperated and contributed 100 percent of their endowments, 60 
Ksh, everyone would have benefitted and individual payments would have been equal to 120 
Ksh. This would have been equal to an increase in individual earnings of 33percent! This 
simple example shows that cooperating always will increase potential earnings given that 
everybody fully cooperates. 
However, if one participant, call him participant A, decided not to cooperate and contributes 
nothing to the group fund and the other two participants, B and C, fully cooperates, 
participant A would get a payment of:  60 Ksh + ((60+60)*2))/3) Ksh = 140 Ksh. 
Payment to individual A would in this case be higher than if he/she also had fully contributed 
to the group fund and this will always give people incentives not to fully cooperate and 
instead free ride on others contributions. Participant B and C would in this scenario only get: 
((60+60)*2))/3) Ksh = 80 Ksh each. This would in turn prevent them to fully cooperate in fear 
of somebody else free riding on them, and the example illustrates very well the problems 
associated with public-goods. As there is no way of excluding people from consuming any 
public good people will always have the incentive to free-ride on others. 
Instead of people fully cooperating or fully free-riding on others Ledyard (1995) finds that 
subjects in (one-shoot) public good games experiments generally contributes between 40 and 
60 percent of their endowments. Summary statistics from these games played in an ethnic 
diversified setting is consistent with Ledyard findings as mean contributions for all subgroups 
lays in the range from 46 to 53 percent and indicates that people in an ethnic diversified 
setting do not behave any differently than others. On average people do not fully cooperate or 
fully free ride on others. 
 
Result 1. On average people in the anonymous-, mixed- and homogenous public good games 
contribute roughly 50 percent of their endowments to the group fund. 
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7.1.2 Difference between games 
Surprisingly, mean contribution is highest for the mixed public good game compared to both 
of the other two games. Based on conclusion form other research (Hjort 2011; Miguel 2004) I 
expected that players in these PG games would place greater weight on the utility of co-
ethnics than compared to non-co-ethnics and thus that I would find that mean contribution 
would be highest in the homogenous PG game. But based on the data in the control group 
there seems to be no discrimination along ethnic lines for public goods. Comparing average 
contribution for the variable “Overall” across the different games in appendix 14.1, I find that 
the difference in willingness to contribute to the group fund for the control group is not 
statistically significant between the different games, i.e., I find no evidence that supports that 
individuals place greater weight on the utility of co-ethnics compared to non-co-ethnics. If 
anything, contributions in the mixed game are higher than in both the homogenous- and the 
anonymous game, contrary to what one would think if ethnic diversity had a negative impact 
on people’s willingness to cooperate. 
Although not statistically significant the negative finding on ethnic preference is striking and 
suggests that one cannot easily jump from the observation of ethnic divides to the conclusion 
that there are fundamental ethnic preferences and beliefs that will apply to all situations.  
 
Result 2. The difference in contribution across the different games is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Especially the lack of greater giving in the homogenous public-good game came about as 
unexpected and my main expectation that individuals are more generous towards co-ethnics 
and that they therefore contribute more to a homogenous co-ethnic group fund are proven 
wrong.  
7.1.3 Distribution between games 
Looking closer at the histograms for the control group I obtained additional information about 
participants’ behavior in the respective games, information that is not captured by only 
looking at the mean. From the histograms in figure 4 at the next page, I see that there are only 
small differences in the distribution between games indicating that the distribution in the 
control group may be more or less equal to one another.  
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Figure 4. Distribution control group. 
As shown in the histograms above, roughly 10 percent of the people in the control group in all 
games exposes a truly egocentric behavior and contributes nothing to the group found. At the 
other extremity, there are on average more than 10 percent of the individuals who makes a 
group wealth-maximizing decision and put everything they have into the group basket. This 
percentage is higher for both the mixed and homogenous PG game than for the anonymous 
PG game. However, one sees that most contributions in all games are centered around 50 
percent, although a high percentage in every game only contribute around 30 percent of their 
endowments. Testing if the distribution across games is equal to one another by running a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, appendix 14.2, I get high p-values for all comparisons, indicating 
that I can keep H0 that states that there are no difference in distributions across games. This 
means that the observed difference in the histograms is not huge enough to conclude that here 
is a statistically significant difference in the distribution between the three different games.  
 
Result 3. The difference in distribution across the different games for the control group are 
not statistically significant.  
 
As I found no statistically significant difference in mean contribution, this result is not 
unexpected. As I see it, it only provides more strength behind result 2. 
7.1.4 Summary contribution to the group fund 
When looking closer at the control group I find that people on average contribute roughly 50 
percent of their endowments and this is similar to what one find in other public goods game 
independent of ethnic setting or not. Contrary to what one should expect I find somewhat 
surprisingly that people in the homogenous public good game contributes less to the group 
fund compared to people in the two other games. However, I find that the difference in 
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average contribution between the anonymous-, mixed- and homogenous public good game is 
not statistically significant. Looking at the histograms for the control group, I find that the 
observed difference in distribution across games is not huge enough to conclude that the 
difference is statistically significant. Together these two test indicates that people in the 
control group on average behave similarly in the different public goods games. I find no 
evidence of co-ethnic preferences.  
7.2. Socio-economic variables 
Concentrating on socio-economic categories, I want to see if there exist a systematic 
difference in average contribution between people in the control group by dividing them by 
gender, age and level of education.  
7.2.1 Contribution to the group fund 
Looking back at table 1, I see that there are some differences in mean contribution for the 
social-economic categories. In the anonymous public good game I find that for the gender 
category females exposes a more cooperative behavior than males and contribute on average 
slightly more. Looking at the age variables I see that those aged 35 or below contributes on 
average less to the group fund than those aged over 35. Related to level of education I find 
that people with a higher level of education on average contributes less than those with a 
lower level of education. On average people with education level above median exposes the 
most selfish behavior in the group by contributing least to the funding of the group fund in the 
anonymous public good game. These findings above are also valid for the mixed- and the 
homogenous public good game.  
So far, these findings are in line with what I have presented as one of my main expectation, 
namely that the socio-economic variables affect willingness to contribute to the group fund 
differently. My expectation related to the socio-economic categories is solely based on my 
own subjective assumptions; 1) Men are more involved in politics in Kenya and are therefore 
being more strongly affected by ethnic divergences than women since the politic arena have 
been greatly influenced by ethnic contradictions, 2) Older people have a different mindset 
than younger people due to experience and, 3) Education level will somehow be reflected in 
how people make choices.   
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Table 2. Public-good game: Socio-economic categories in the control group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous PG 
game 
Mixed PG game Homogenous PG 
game 
Female 0.914 0.247 2.564 
 (4.252) (4.628) (4.731) 
    
Age – (demeaned) 0.144 0.200 0.181 
 (0.201) (0.219) (0.224) 
    
Education (demeaned) -0.626 -0.0229 -0.0742 
 (0.628) (0.683) (0.698) 
    
Constant 42.73*** 43.35*** 40.86*** 
 (7.273) (7.917) (8.093) 
Observations 150 150 150 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Running a regression with the socio-economic variables, table 2 above, I find that in the 
anonymous PG game females on average contribute 0.914 percentage points more than males, 
increase in age increases contribution by 0.14 percentage points and a higher education level, 
a bit surprisingly, seem to lower contribution by 0.626 percentage points. None of these 
findings  are however statistically significant at any reasonable significance level. Looking at 
the mixed PG game the regression result shows that the difference between the subgroups are 
on average less than in the anonymous PG game. In the homogenous PG game one sees that 
females contribute 2.564 percentage points more than males. For age and education level the 
difference in contribution is similar to the findings in the anonymous- and mixed PG game. 
As for the anonymous PG game, none of the findings for the mixed- and homogenous PG 
game is statistically significant either.  
 
From data, table 1 and table 2, I observe that there are differences in mean contribution for the 
social-economic categories: gender, age and education in all games. Testing if mean 
contribution in each social-economic category: female vs. male, aged above or below 353 and 
education level is equal to one another, H0, in appendix 14.3, I get high p-values in all games 
indicating that the observed difference in mean contribution is not statistically significant 
                                                          
3 People in the sample are aged 18 to 68. To be able to do many of the analysis I choose to divide people in the 
two age groups. Equal and below age 35 and age above 35. 
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different from each other. The observed differences in mean contribution is not huge enough 
to conclude that females behave differently than men, that those aged above 35 years act any 
different than those below the age of 35 or that level of education significantly affect mean 
contribution in any of the games. Put differently, the socio-economic characteristics of the 
subject pool do not matter for contribution behavior. Since contributions are different, 
motivations to contribute may be different between subjects, but these motives are unrelated 
to the socio-economic characteristics of the participants. My expectation that I would find a 
difference between the socio-economic categories was also proven wrong. 
 
Result 4. The difference in contribution level for the socio-economic categories in each game 
separately is not statistically significantly. 
 
7.2.2 Mean contribution across games 
As for the variable “Overall” I compare if mean contribution for the gender, age and 
education-level categories across games are similar (appendix 14.4). The test produce high p-
values for all variables indicating that willingness to contribute to the group fund between the 
social economic categories is not statistically different between the different games. This 
indicates that females, males, people aged below 35 etc. behave more or less in the same way 
across games. Although I observe that mean contribution for all socio-economic variables 
changes across games I don’t find any evidence that supports that this change is huge enough 
to conclude that the observed difference is statistically significant.  
 
Results 5. The differences in mean contribution for the social-economic categories across 
games are not statistically significant. 
 
7.2.3 Distribution 
Although I have found that the average in means between the socio-economic variables is not 
statistically different from each other in any of the games played it may be that the 
distributions for each socio-economic variable reveals some new information.  I start by 
briefly discuss the overall picture in each game. 
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7.2.3.1 Anonymous public good game 
Starting with the anonymous PG game, figure 5 below, one sees that the distribution for males 
vs. females and age below 35 vs. age above 35 respectively looks pretty much similar to each 
other. The histogram for the education dummy shows that a high percentage of those with 
above median education level exposes a selfish behavior and contribute less than 50 percent 
of their endowments whereas most of those with below median education are more 
cooperative and contribute more than 50 percent of their endowments. 
 
 
Figure 5. Anonymous public good game, histograms.  
 
7.2.3.2 Mixed public good game 
In the mixed PG game, figure 6 below, it appears that the biggest difference in distribution is 
found between males and females. For females there seem to be a general flattening of the 
distribution compared to males. In the summary statistics I found that females on average 
contribute more than males and the histogram shows that there is a substantial fraction more 
females who contribute 100 percent of their endowments than males. The majority of males 
contribute little over 50 percent of their endowments to the group fund. Looking at the 
histograms for age and education there does not seem to be any difference in distribution 
between age group and education-level. 
 
Figure 6. Mixed public good game, histograms. 
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7.2.3.3 Homogenous public good game 
For the homogenous PG game, figure 7 below, the histograms shows that the difference in 
distribution is very small for the socio-economic variables; gender, age and education in this 
game. The only thing worth mentioning is that is seems that more people above the age of 35 
contributes 100 percent to the group fund than those who are younger. 
 
Figure 7. Homogenous public good game, histograms. 
 
When I formally test if the distributions in each social-economic category is equal to one 
another with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, appendix 14.5, I get high p-values for the socio-
economic categories gender and age in all games, and I can conclude that there does not exists 
a statistically significant different pattern between the distribution between male and female 
or between people aged under or above 35 in any of the games played.  
 
Results 6. The distribution between male and female, age below or above 35 are not 
statistically significant different from each other in any of the three games played. 
 
Although there are variations in for example how woman contribute to the funding of public 
goods vs. men these variations are not big enough to conclude that woman in the sample 
behave any differently than men. For the mixed- and the homogenous public good games the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also produces a high p-value for education indicating that one finds 
no difference in distribution across education-level in these two games either and I can 
conclude that for the mixed and the homogenous games I do not find any statistically 
significant difference in distribution in any of the socio-economic categories. The test 
concludes on the other hand that the difference in distribution among those with below 
median education and those with above median education are statistically significantly in the 
anonymous public good game.  
45 
 
 
Result 7. The difference in distribution between those with below median education and those 
with above median education is statistically significant, but only in the anonymous game. 
 
As I only find that there is a statistically significant difference in distribution for education 
level in the anonymous game and not in the identified rounds it is impossible to say anything 
about what is causing this difference.  
7.2.4 Robustness checks 
Table 3. Public-good Game: Contribution below 50% 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous PG 
game 
Mixed PG game Homogenous PG 
game 
Female -0.0515 0.0519 0.0487 
 (0.0837) (0.0832) (0.0850) 
    
Age - based on 
recruitment information 
0.000801 -0.00336 -0.00200 
 (0.00396) (0.00394) (0.00402) 
    
Education (demeaned) 0.0210* -0.00238 0.000880 
 (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0125) 
    
Constant 0.448*** 0.475*** 0.499*** 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.145) 
Observations 150 150 150 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
To check if the findings from the histograms and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are accurate I 
create a dummy variable which equals 1 for contributions below 50% and then I run a 
regression based on this variable. The results is shown in table 3 above, and I find that the 
coefficient for education (demeaned) is positive and statistically significant for the 
anonymous public-good game, reflecting the findings from the histograms. More people with 
above median education level in the anonymous PG game tend to contribute less than 50 
percent of their endowments than those with education level below median and this finding is 
statistically significant at a 10 % significance level. Another interesting finding with this table 
is that one sees that some variables changes sign compared to table 2 and that this change is 
46 
 
not consistent across games. But for all variables except educ_dm in the anonymous game the 
findings are not statistically significant and I will not discuss them further.   
Result 8. More people with above median education level in the anonymous PG game tend to 
contribute less than 50 percent of their endowments than those with education level below 
median and this finding is statistically significant at a 10 % significance level 
 
7.3 Summary results, part I 
People contribute on average roughly 50 percent of their endowments in all games which lead 
to individual payments of 90 Ksh. I find no evidence that ethnicity, or any of the socio-
economic background categories affect willingness to cooperate. Contrary to what one should 
believe there appears to be a negative effect of ethnicity on contribution as people contribute 
more to the group fund in a mixed ethnic setting than in a homogenous ethnic setting. This 
indicates that there may be other factors than just ethnicity that explains the level of 
contribution which again may indicate that ethnic divergence is not a sole obstacle to local 
fund raising initiatives in Kenya. Focusing on socio-economic categories; I find that in all 
games are females more cooperative than males, that higher age increase cooperation and that 
those with education level below median are more cooperative than those with a higher level 
of education. None of these findings is however statistically significant at any reasonable 
significance level. Trying to establish if social economic categories affect contribution in the 
public good games in any way, I test for equality of mean in each game separately and across 
games. But in neither scenario do I find that the observed differences in these social-economic 
categories are statistically significant. Neither when I look closer at the distribution do I find 
that there is a difference. Testing the observed difference in distribution I find that it is only a 
statistically significant difference between people with different education level in the 
anonymous game.  
8.0 Experimental results, part II 
In this section, I first look at beliefs of others contribution before I include the dictator game 
(DG) in the analysis. The aim is to see if I find a relation between beliefs of others 
contribution and own contribution and altruism and contribution that can help me explain the 
results from part I.  
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8.1 Beliefs of others contribution 
In the public goods games beliefs about others` contribution are included in the dataset as they 
can be an important factor in explaining own contributions. In the game set-up participants 
were asked to state how much they believed others in the group would contribute to the group 
fund before they made their own decision. The difference between own contribution and 
beliefs about others contributions is often interpreted as capturing the degree of free riding. 
Fischbacher et al. (2010) shows that most people have a desire to contribute less than they 
think others are contributing, and that this over time leads to an unraveling of cooperation in 
voluntary public good games. By including this variable it will be easier to see if participants 
act in accordance with their own beliefs and behave as conditional cooperators or if 
participants consciously try to free ride on others.  
The game specifications are similar to the first and second specification in the public-good 
game in part I but where Yi is replaced with “beliefs of others contribution” instead of “own 
contribution”.  
8.1.1 Results 
 
Figure 8. Difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution for the control group. 
Presenting a visual of the summary statistics for the control group as a whole in figure 8 
above one see that the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution 
is relative small. Participants in the anonymous PG game contribute on average a bit more 
than what they expect others in the same group will contribute to the group fund, and there is 
on average no evidence of people free riding in this game.  
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Participants in the mixed- and the homogenous PG game however contribute less than what 
they expect others will contribute, in line with Fischbacher et al. (2010). On average it 
appears that participants in the control group in the identified games deliberately choose to 
free ride on others. In the homogenous game, given that all people in this group are 
categorized to belong to the same ethnic group one should expect that there would be a 
minimum of free riding in this game. But the negative gap is somewhat surprisingly biggest 
for the homogenous PG game, by about 4 percentage points and I find evidence that people on 
average free ride on others in both the mixed- and homogenous public good game. When I 
test the difference in mean between own contribution and beliefs of others in appendix 14.6, I 
however find that the difference is not statistically significant.   
 
Result 9.  I find evidence that people on average free ride on others in both the mixed and 
homogenous public good game. But the finding is not statistically significant.  
 
Although the test reveals that the difference in own contribution and beliefs of others 
contribution on average not is statistically significant it is interesting to look a bit closer at the 
data. Game specification allows me to take a closer look at how individuals contributed in the 
identified games and I can distinguish between beliefs of participant A and participant B in 
the identified games where this distinction is interesting. In the mixed PG game there exist a 
co-ethnic and a non-co-ethnic profile based on traditional alliances. The distinction of group 
member A and group member B does not tell me which is the co-ethnic profile or non-co-
ethnic profile but I find that there exist a relatively huge difference in mean contribution 
between beliefs of group member A and group member B. Belief about group member A`s 
contribution equals 48.08 percent and belief about group member B`s contribution equals 
52.67 percent, a difference equal to 4.6 percentage points. Own contribution, 49.94 percent, is 
midway between these and it is therefore reasonable to say that people in the mixed PG game 
on average behave as conditional cooperators.  
In the homogenous PG game all participants belong to the same ethnic profile. But also in this 
game I find a difference between group member A and B, 48.75 percent versus 55.25 percent. 
Own contribution is only 48.08 percent and I find that there is a relative huge difference 
between own contribution and beliefs of participant B`s contribution. Again I find clear 
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evidence against my initial expectations that people place greater weight on the utility of co-
ethnic compared to non-co-ethnics. The result from this game may again indicate that 
difference in ethnic profile alone does not explain all the difference in beliefs in the mixed PG 
game. Remember that a participants profile in addition to ethnicity include information about 
age and education level and the findings from the homogenous PG game indicates that age 
and education level also seem to have an impact on beliefs of others contribution. It may seem 
that information about age and level is weighted stronger than information about ethnicity.  
 
Result 10.  On average it appears that people in the mixed public good game acts as 
conditional cooperators. Results from the homogenous public-good game indicates that 
profile fixed effects such as age and education level are also important factors in explaining 
beliefs of others contribution.  
 
 
8.1.2 Distribution  
 
Figure 9. Distribution of the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution. 
The distribution of beliefs of others is in itself not very interesting. Instead I will look at the 
distribution for the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution.  
Looking at figure 9 above I see that there exist internal differences between own contribution 
and beliefs of others in all games. The histograms show that the gap is centered around zero in 
all games but at the same time that there exist differences between people in the control group 
across games. The mixed- and homogenous PG games are more skewed to the left compared 
to the anonymous game, which reflects the findings from figure 8. When I compare the 
differences in distribution across games with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, appendix 14.7, I 
find that the observed difference in distribution between own contribution and beliefs of 
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others contribution from figure 9 above is only statistically significant when I compare the 
anonymous public good game with the mixed public good game.  
 
Result 11. The difference in distribution between own contribution and beliefs of others 
contribution across games is only statistically significant between the anonymous- and the 
mixed public good game. 
 
8.1.3 Summary beliefs of others contribution 
The difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution is relatively small 
for the control group. Overall, it appears that people does act somewhat in accordance with 
how they expect to be treated back. The difference is negative for both the mixed and the 
homogenous public good game and surprisingly the biggest gap is found in the homogenous 
public good game. If ethnic consideration and patrionalism were the sole determinant of 
expectation of others contribution one should expect to see more consistency between own 
contribution and beliefs of others contribution in the homogenous game than in the other 
games, as participants in this game only exists of co-ethnics. As this is not the case, other 
profile fixed effects such as age and level of education also seem to strongly influent people’s 
beliefs of others contribution.  
8.2 Dictator Game 
Prior to participation in the public good games the same players participated in a dictator 
game. In the dictator game participants were informed that they were randomly paired with 
one other partner. He or she, (the dictator) received an endowment of 50 Ksh and could 
decide how much to give away to the other participant. The dictators would get to keep 
whatever they did not give away.  
The idea behind the game is that contribution level captures an individual`s willingness to 
share with others, which is a proxy for the weight assigned to others welfare. One can say that 
contribution level captures people’s altruism towards others. The dictator game is included in 
the analysis as I find it interesting to see whether or not there is a relationship between 
peoples altruism towards others in the dictator game and willingness to cooperate in the 
public good games.  
51 
 
8.2.1 Game Set-Up 
The game was played in two different informational settings. In the first round of the dictator 
game the participants were anonymously paired with other workshop participants and none of 
the participants had any information of whom they were partnered with. The main outcome of 
interest here is generosity towards an anonymous partner. In the following two rounds, 
participants were paired with profiles from their co-ethnic group based on traditional alliances 
as in the public-good game4. The main outcome of interest in this game is generosity towards 
co-ethnics.  
In the dictator game, data from the different game rounds are pooled together and standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level. In other words, the vectors of observation from the 
anonymous dictator game and for the dictator game with co-ethnics are stacked together: 
Yij = dga_transferij 
Where j = 1, 2, 3 for the anonymous, first co-ethnic and second co-ethnic round respectively. 
 
Primary specification for the dictator game: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 +∑𝛽1+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 +∑𝛽4+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
Where CEij is an indicator variable for whether round j is a round where individual i faces a 
co-ethnic profile. Further, α, the average transfer in the control group in the anonymous round 
is added as well as the profile fixed effects αp, which only apply in the co-ethnic setting.  
As for the public good game there is also a specification with control variables: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 +∑𝛽1+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 +∑𝛽4+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
The vector Xi includes the same socio-economic categories as in the public good game: 
- Gender 
                                                          
4 In the identified dictator games it was only played games with co-ethnics, due to a programming glitch. 
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- Age 
- Years of education (demeaned) 
8.2.2 Results 
Table 4. Dictator Game: Average transfers 
 (1) (2) 
 Anonymous Co-ethnic 
Control 43.72 41.91 
 (17.69) (20.14) 
   
Female 45.16 44.43 
 (19.15) (22.25) 
   
Male 42.11 39.08 
 (15.89) (17.12) 
   
Age equal or below 35 43.55 - 
 (18.04) (-) 
   
Age above 35 44.14 41.91 
 (17.02) (20.14) 
   
Under Median 
Education 
43.62 44.15 
 (21.81) (23.03) 
   
Above Median 
Education 
43.79 40.29 
 (14.12) (17.67) 
   
Observations 150 2825 
Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses. Note: mean coefficients are given in percent. 
 
From table 4 above one sees that in the anonymous dictator game people in the control group 
on average give away 43.72 percent of their endowments, keeping roughly 56 percent to 
themselves. In the co-ethnic dictator game people in the control group on average only gives 
away 41.91 percent of their endowments, and I find that people in the anonymous game on 
average show a higher level of altruism than people in the co-ethnic games. Similar to the 
results for the control group in the public good game I find that there is a surprisingly negative 
                                                          
5 The co-ethnic dictator game has a total of only 282 observations instead of 300 in the control group due to 1) 
drop of some individuals since not paired with a co-ethnic due to mistakes in tribe assignment 2) programming 
mistake; in one of the 12 profiles people did not have the chance to enter transfer decision and 3) some 
overlap between the two co-ethnic groups. 
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effect of ethnicity in the dictator game also. But when I test if the means are different across 
games I find that the difference in average giving anonymously versus the two identified 
games are not statistically significant for the control group (appendix 14.8).  
When I split the analysis and compare mean transfer separately for the socio-economic 
variables across games I find that there are no difference in mean transfer between the 
anonymous and the identified games for any of the socio-economic variables (appendix 14.9). 
The difference in mean transfer is not huge enough to conclude that the difference is 
statistically significant. The only variable where the difference in mean is close to be 
statistically significant is for those who have education level above median.  
Nonetheless, I observe that there is a difference in mean and that this negative difference 
between the anonymous and identified game goes in the same direction as observed in the 
public good games. 
 
Result 12. People in the anonymous dictator game show more generosity towards others than 
people in the co-ethnic dictator game. The observed difference in mean transfer between the 
anonymous and the identified games is however not statistically significant for any of the 
variables. 
 
 
Until now I have only focused on differences between the games and observed that as in the 
public good game there is a negative effect of ethnicity. When I look at each game separately 
in summary statistics from table 4, I see that there also exist internal differences in the socio-
economic variables. Females show a higher level of altruism than males in the anonymous 
game. For the socio-economic categories age and education there is only a very small 
difference.  
In the identified games females also here transfer more than males and this difference is 
greater than in the anonymous game. For age I cannot complete a comparison as there are no 
observations for people aged below 35, and for education I find that there is still a relative 
small difference in mean between those with below and above median education, as in the 
anonymous dictator game. 
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Table 5. Dictator game: Generosity 
 (1) (2) 
 Anonymous DG 
game 
Identified DG 
game 
Female 2.771 4.502* 
 (2.997) (2.437) 
   
Age - based on 
recruitment information 
0.0768  
 (0.142)  
   
Education (demeaned) -0.0981 -0.520 
 (0.442) (0.325) 
   
Constant 39.77*** 39.49*** 
 (5.126) (1.748) 
Observations 150 282 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Running a regression with females, age and education as independent variables, table 5, I find 
that it is only the variable female in the identified DG game that is statistically significant. 
This means that the difference in mean contribution between females and males are 
statistically significant at a 10 percent significance level. I find that females show more 
generosity towards others than males in the identified game. 
 
Result 13. There are differences in means for the socio-economic categories in both games 
but the difference in altruism is only statistically significant for females in the identified 
dictator game.  
 
8.2.3 Comparing Public-good Game with Dictator Game 
Until now I have only looked at the public good game and the dictator game separately which 
in turn have shown that there are some similarities between the games. It is therefore 
interesting to find out if these similarities come about as a chance or if I find that there in fact 
is so that behavior in the dictator game can explain behavior in the public good games. Does a 
higher level of altruism in the dictator game leads to a higher contribution level in the public 
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good games or are there no co-effects? Expecting a positive relationship between transfer in 
the dictator games and contribution in the public good games can be reasonable as peoples 
altruism towards others may indicate that people put a higher consideration on other peoples 
welfare and are thus more inclined to cooperate with others. They will therefore contribute 
more to the funding of the group fund in the public good game. I start by looking at the 
correlation between the two games. 
The correlation coefficient measures 
the strength and direction of a linear 
relationship between two variables on a 
scatterplot, as shown in figure 10. 
Dictator game transfer is put on the x –
axis as it is reasonable to assume that 
generosity towards others may help 
explain people’s willingness to 
contribute to the funding of the public 
good. As seen from the scatterplot in 
figure 10, there are no systematic 
pattern between transfers in the dictator game and contribution in the public good game. The 
observations are spread and there is no indication of a positive linear relationship as was 
expected. 
Testing the correlation between transfer in the dictator game and contribution in the public 
good games for the control group reveals a correlation coefficient of 0.1678. A correlation 
coefficient of 1 indicates total positive correlation, if 0 there is no correlation and -1 is total 
negative correlation. 0.1678 indicate that there is a very weak positive correlation between 
transfers in the dictator game and contribution in the public good game.  
 
Result 14. There is no indication that there is a relationship between transfer in the dictator 
game and contribution level in the public good games. 
 
However, when I split the analysis and look at the anonymous games and the identified games 
separately the pictures changes. 
Figure 10. Scatterplot of correlation between PG and DG 
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When I compare contribution in the control group in the anonymous public good game with 
transfer in the anonymous dictator game, I get a correlation coefficient of 0.3498, indicating 
that there is a weak uphill linear relationship between transfers in the DG and contribution in 
the PG game. Looking at the socio economic categories in the anonymous game I find that the 
strongest positive relationship, 0.5282, is found for people with below median education. 
Comparing the mixed public good game with the identified dictator game, I get a correlation 
coefficient of 0.3072. Here, the strongest correlation, 0.4326 is found for people with above 
median education. 
Lastly, while comparing the homogenous PG game with the identified DG I find a correlation 
coefficient of 0.0499, which indicate that there is hardly any correlation effect at all. Looking 
closer at the socio-economic categories, I find that for females there is a weak negative linear 
relationship. This is also the case for people with below median education. For males, there is 
a relative strong positive linear relationship.  
 
Result 15. Comparing the anonymous games and the identified games separately I find 
evidence of weak linear relationship in the socio economic categories. 
 
To summarize this section I found that when testing the correlation between transfer and 
contribution in the anonymous and identified games I do not find a clear pattern. The 
correlation coefficient does not indicate a strong positive linear relationship in any of the 
games. When comparing the socio-economic categories I find that people behave differently 
in all games and there is no socio-economic variable that is consistently independent of game 
comparisons. It appears that there are no strong relationship between peoples altruism and 
peoples willingness to contribute to the group fund. I can therefore not conclude that 
contribution level found in the results from part I are affected by transfer in the dictator game.  
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8.2.4 Regression 
Although I have not found a very strong correlation effect between transfer in the dictator 
game and contribution in the public good game, transfer may none the less have an effect on 
people’s contribution level in the public good games. Table 6 below presents the results from 
running a regression where I include transfer in the dictator game as an independent variable 
in the public good games analysis. 
Table 6. Public good game: summary statistics when transfer in dictator game is included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall Anonymous game Identified game 1 Identified game 2 
Female 9.748 17.96 8.906         5.084 
 (6.513) (19.39) (15.87)         (9.091) 
     
Education (demeaned) -0.913 2.167 -0.0592         -0.329 
  (0.873) (2.787) (2.540)         (1.323) 
     
Dict Game: Transfer 0.377*** 0.560 0.534**          0.301** 
 (0.111) (0.346) (0.246)         (0.152) 
     
dg_transfer_fem -0.221 -0.284 -0.222          -0.147 
 (0.146) (0.444) (0.374)          (0.207) 
     
dg_transfer_edu 0.0113 -0.0574 -0.00550         -0.00622 
 (0.0189) (0.0623) (0.0565)          (0.0283) 
     
Constant 32.68*** 19.48 28.98***           37.04*** 
 (4.824) (15.12) (9.910)           (6.506) 
Observations 435 54 90            181 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The first column is general and I do not divide between non-identified and identified games. 
In the second column I only look at the anonymous games, i.e. the anonymous public good 
game and the anonymous dictator game. In the two last columns I look at the identified 
games, where column 3 looks specifically at the identified dictator game and the mixed public 
good game, and column 4 looks at the identified dictator game and the homogenous public 
good game. 
 
Result 16. I find that transfer in the dictator game (the variable “Dict Game: Transfer) 
positively affect people’s willingness to contribute to the groups fund in all games and the 
finding is statistically significant for all games except the anonymous public good game.  
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8.3 Summary results, part II 
In part II of the analysis I wanted to look at both beliefs of others contribution and transfer in 
the dictator game to see if I could find an explanation to the results in part I of the analysis. I 
started by looking at beliefs of others contributions and I found that on average the difference  
between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution is relatively small for the control 
group in any of the games played. There is evidence of people free riding in both the mixed 
and homogenous public good games. It appears that all profile fixed effects, not only ethnicity 
(hometown) have a strong impact on peoples beliefs of others contribution. Although I see 
that there is variation between people in the control group, beliefs of others contribution 
appears on average to be a benchmark for peoples own contribution.  
In the dictator game I found that people in the anonymous game on average show more 
generosity and altruism than people do in the co-ethnic games. Similar to results from the 
public good game I observe that there is a negative effect on ethnicity from the anonymous 
dictator game to the identified dictator game; however, this finding is not statistically 
significant. Investigating if behavior in the dictator games affected people’s behavior in the 
public good games I  wanted to test if there is a correlation between transfer in the dictator 
game and contribution in the public good games. When testing the different games up against 
each other I do not find a clear pattern, neither between the different games or the socio-
economic categories. Overall, the correlation coefficient does not indicate a strong linear 
relationship in any of the games. However when I include transfer as an independent variable 
in the public good games analysis and run a regression I do find that transfer in the dictator 
game have a positive statistically significant effect on contribution in all games. Correlation 
does not necessarily imply causality and in this case I find that although there is no strong 
evidence of a linear relationship I find evidence that transfer in the dictator game affect 
contribution in the public god games positively.  
9.0 Experimental results, part III 
In the last part of the assignment I introduce the different treatments to the analysis. In 
addition to document cooperation in within-group (between co-ethnics) and cross-group 
interactions (between non-co-ethnics) the focus in this study is also to see how much 
cooperative behavior, and co-ethnic preferences are potentially affected by priming different 
aspects of individual identity. 
59 
 
9.1 Priming 
The question is if priming people with different social identities affect people’s willingness to 
contribute to the group fund differently in the public goods games. 
The category salience is randomly assigned to the participants in the experiment to elicit each 
treatment group preferences in the public good games. Priming the participants with different 
social categories (treatments) was inserted between games and was randomly allocated within 
each session. Eight different questions for each prime were developed and piloted to make the 
priming subtle rather than blatant to limit experimenter demand effects. The different primes 
were developed to trigger a certain attitude. National priming attempts to stoke national 
feeling and pride by asking questions such as; “Kenya’s flower industry has been growing 
rapidly at 20% per year. In your opinion, which is the most beautiful Kenyan flower?” Ethnic 
priming in contrast reminds subjects of cultural differences within Kenya by asking questions 
such as; “This greeting comes from which region: Orie?”. Political competition priming 
highlights political division and participation; “How many political candidates are running 
for the Presidency?” The last prime, the neutral priming (= control group), which the results 
from part I and part II are based upon, focus on issues in daily life in Nairobi; “How often do 
you ride a matatu (minibus) every week?” Any differences in responses will be attributed to 
the different treatments (primes).  
As one of the main interest lies in the comparison of treatment effects across game rounds the 
primary specification pools the data form the different game rounds and I estimate one single 
regression on the anonymous rounds and the two co-ethnic rounds together. Standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level. 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the public good game contribution. 
The primary specification:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑗 +∑𝛽2+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 +∑𝛽5+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 +∑𝛽8+𝑘
3
𝑘=1
𝑇𝑘 ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
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9.1.2 Results  
Based on the primary specification from the previous page I will in this section look at how 
the treatment primes affects people’s behavior in the public good games.  
Table 7. Public good Game: Effect of priming 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous PG 
game 
Mixed PG game Homogenous Pg 
game 
National Prime -4.697 -4.814 -3.742 
 (3.110) (3.331) (3.470) 
    
Ethnic Prime 0.325 -0.816 4.874 
 (3.110) (3.331) (3.470) 
    
Political Comp. Prime -1.716 -3.157 3.370 
 (3.115) (3.336) (3.475) 
    
Constant 47.89*** 49.94*** 48.08*** 
 (2.210) (2.367) (2.465) 
Observations 608 608 608 
Standard errors in parentheses. Note: mean coefficients are given in percent * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Looking at the result from the regressions in table 7 above where I include the different 
treatment effects I find that priming individuals with national identity has a substantial 
negative impact on contribution in all public good games, contrary to what I initial expected 
and presented as one of my main expectations. The finding is not statistically significant, but 
the result comes nonetheless about as unexpected and surprising as the purpose of the prime is 
to invoke national pride, and one should therefore expect to see an increase in average 
contribution. What exactly drives this negative impact is unclear but it may be that priming 
individuals with national identity invokes a national identity based on distrust and selfishness 
instead of pride and cooperation. Looking back at Kenya’s history of political conflict, 
corruption and high inequality this may not be a bad explanation as building up national pride 
never has been a part of the country’s politics.   
From the review over Kenya’s history one learned that ethnic divides have been and still are 
central to Kenya politics with parties and coalitions organized along ethnic lines. To the 
extent that political competition and ethnic division are closely related in peoples thinking, 
one should expect to find that the ethnic identity treatment prime and the political competition 
identity treatment prime have similar effects on contribution in the different games. From 
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table 7 I see that the two primes have similar effects on contribution in both the mixed- and 
the homogenous public good game. The ethnic- and political competition treatment primes 
affect contribution negatively in the mixed PG game and positively in the homogenous PG 
game. Barth, and proponents of the instrumental approach to ethnicity argues that people act 
on the basis of ethnic categories only if they are perceived as useful (Barth, 1969). A 
substantial increase in contribution when primed with ethnic- and political competition 
identity in the homogenous game may give support to this view. However, none of these 
findings is statistically significant at any reasonable significance level. One question one may 
ask is if the priming has been too subtle? When priming individuals there will always be a 
trade-off in priming to strong and invoke a certain behavior versus priming to discrete, and 
where one find that the treatment primes has no impact. It could also be that the result only 
reflects that election date was still far away when the data was collected. Closer to the 
Election Day when political campaigning ramps up one should expect that the impact of these 
treatment primes will be greater.   
 
Result 17. National identity treatment prime lower peoples contribution to the group fund in 
all games. Ethnic- and political competition treatment primes affect contribution  differently 
in all games. However none of the findings are statistically significant. 
 
 
9.1.3 Distribution 
 
Figure 11. Effect of priming on the distribution 
Looking at the distribution for the anonymous-, mixed- and homogenous public good games, I 
see at the histograms for the different treatment primes does not look very much different 
from the control group in any of the games. Some contribute nothing and some contribute all, 
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but most contributions are as in the control group centered around 50 percent. We have 
already learned that national identity prime lowers overall contribution and looking closer at 
the histograms I see that when subjects are primed with national identity this leads 
surprisingly to more people contributing nothing to the group fund in all games, where one in 
fact should expect it to be the other way around. As mentioned earlier, by triggering a national 
identity one should expect that more people would be inclined to contribute more to the 
welfare of the group and thus contribute more to the group fund. Ethnic priming and political 
competition priming also leads to more people contributing nothing to the group fund 
compared to the control group, but this increase are not as huge as for the national identity 
prime and more in line with what one could expect given the nature of the prime.  
When I test if the distributions are equal to each other with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
appendix 14.10, I get high p-values indicating that all distributions; treatments versus the 
control group and the different treatments set up against each other, are not statistically 
significantly different from each other. Based on the tests, I find that it is only the difference 
in distribution between the control group and the national identity treatment prime in the 
anonymous game, and the difference in distribution between the national identity treatment 
prime and the ethnic identity treatment prime in the homogenous games that are close to being 
statistically significant at a 10 percent significance level. 
 
Result 18. The difference in distribution for the control group compared to the different 
treatments and the different treatments set up against each other are not statistically significant 
different from each other in any of the games played.  
 
But, when I split the test on equality of distribution on the socio economic categories I do find 
that there are some differences in how people behave in the different games when priming is 
introduced. See appendix 14.11. 
In the anonymous public good game I find that the distribution for people aged below 35 are 
different when primed with national identity compared to both ethnic identity and political 
competition identity. For people with education level above median I also find the same 
pattern as for people aged below 35. 
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In the mixed public good game I get high p-values for all tests and I find no evidence that the 
socio-economic categories have an effect on the distribution.  
In the homogenous public good game I find that the distribution for females are different 
when primed with national identity compared to both ethnic identity and political competition 
identity. And also that the distribution for people aged below 35 are different when primed 
with national identity compared to both ethnic identity and political competition identity. 
 
Result 19.  When I look at each socio-economic category separately I find evidence that the 
treatment primes affect the distribution of some of the variables differently in both the 
anonymous- and the homogenous public good game.   
 
 
9.1.4 Robustness 
From the histograms, I observed that there was an increase in people who contributed nothing 
to the group fund and I want to test if this observation is statistically significant. 
Table 8. Effect of priming: Contribution equals zero. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous Mixed Homogenous 
National Prime 0.0834** 0.0193 0.0237* 
 (0.0369) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
    
Ethnic Prime 0.0311 -0.000631 0.0125 
 (0.0369) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
    
Political Comp. Prime 0.0318 0.0155 0.0155 
 (0.0369) (0.0127) (0.0127) 
    
Constant 0.0800*** 0.0290*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.0262) (0.00896) (0.00897) 
Observations 608 1814 1814 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Running a regression only for contribution which equal zero, i.e. Yij=0, I find that all 
treatment primes leads to an increase in people who contributes nothing to the group fund 
compared to the control group, except the ethnic identity treatment  prime in the mixed public 
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good game. The coefficients are however only statistically significant for the national identity 
treatment prime in the anonymous and the homogenous public good game.  
 
Result 20. When primed with national identity there are more people who contributs nothing 
to the group fund in both the anonymous and the homogenous public good game, compared to 
people in the control group, and this finding is statistically significant. 
 
 
9.1.5 Beliefs of other`s contribution 
Table 9. Beliefs of other`s contribution 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous Mixed Homogenous 
National Prime 4.448* 3.321 3.114 
 (2.349) (2.760) (2.861) 
    
Ethnic Prime 4.536* 4.824* 1.220 
 (2.349) (2.760) (2.847) 
    
Political Comp. Prime 4.559* 3.559 3.884 
 (2.352) (2.765) (2.881) 
    
Constant 47.30*** 50.37*** 52.07*** 
 (1.669) (1.961) (2.027) 
Observations 608 608 598 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Looking at the effect of priming on beliefs of others contribution, I see from table 11 above 
that beliefs of others contribution increases for all treatments in all games compared to the 
control group. The increase is statistically significant for all treatments primes in the 
anonymous public good game and for the ethnic identity treatment prime in the mixed public 
good game. From table 7, “Public good Game. Effect of priming”, I found that the different 
treatments mostly affects peoples own contribution negatively. When I find in table 11 that 
peoples beliefs of others are affected positively when treated with national-, ethnic-, and 
political identity, it suggests that the difference between own contribution and beliefs of 
others contribution on average will be greater. This indicates that there is a higher level of free 
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riding in the public good games when primed with national-, ethnic- or political competition 
identity compared to the control group.   
I investigate this further by running a regression where Yij is the difference between own 
contribution and beliefs. The results are shown in table 10 below. I see that the treatments in 
fact affect the gap in own contribution and beliefs of others negatively compared to in the 
control group but the coefficients are only statistically significant for the national- and 
political competition prime in the both the anonymous and the mixed public good game. It 
may be that the national prime which was intended to make people think about themselves as 
Kenyans in a positive way has made them think about all the problems Kenya are facing 
instead, including political tension. So possibly, the national prime has worked in the same 
direction as the political prime. 
Table 10. Difference between own contribution and beliefs of others contribution 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Anonymous Mixed Homogenous 
National Prime -9.146*** -8.134** -6.423 
 (3.300) (3.552) (3.899) 
    
Ethnic Prime -4.211 -5.640 3.667 
 (3.300) (3.552) (3.880) 
    
Political Comp. Prime -6.274* -6.716* -0.236 
 (3.306) (3.558) (3.926) 
    
Constant 0.589 -0.422 -4.004 
 (2.345) (2.524) (2.762) 
Observations 608 608 598 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 
Result 21. I find that there is a higher level of free riding in the public good games when the 
treatment primes are introduced compared to what I have found in the control group. But the 
finding is only statistically significant for the national- and political competition prime in both 
the anonymous- and mixed public good game. 
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9.2 Summary results, part III  
To summarize part III of the analysis I find that when individuals are primed with national 
identity this surprisingly lowers contribution to the group fund. For the ethnic and political 
competition prime the direction of the impact vary across games. The lower contribution level 
in the national priming case in the homogenous public good game appears to be relatively 
pronounced relative to the ethnic priming in the same game. However, none of the effects 
caused by the treatments primes are large or statistically significant when contribution level is 
the outcome. 
The histograms indicates that there are some differences between the treatments but when 
running a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test I find that the distributions are not statistically 
significanty different from each other. From the histograms, I also see that priming leads to 
more people contributing nothing to the group fund. Running a regression with contribution 
zero I find that when primed with national identity there are more people in the anonymous- 
and the homogenous public good game who contributes nothing to the group fund compared 
to the control group and this finding is statistically significant. Beliefs of others contribution is 
positively affected by the primes and as own contribution mostly is affected negatively this 
leads to a higher level of free riding when treated with national-, ethnic and political 
competition identity compared to the control group. For the anonymous- and mixed public 
good game I find that the national identity treatment prime and the political competition 
identity treatment prime has a negative causal impact on the levels of free riding in these two 
games compared to the control group. Summarized I find that priming individuals have some 
effects on people’s behavior in the public good games, and some of the effects goes in a 
different direction than what I initial expected before I started the research.  
10.0 Summary 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate social cooperation in an ethnic diversified 
society by mainly analyzing how people contribute to the funding of public goods. In doing 
this, I wanted to be able to answer the question “does ethnicity matter for normal people in 
non-political times?” 
To make the reader understand the complexity and challenges associated with ethnicity I 
started the research by a thorough review of the concept of ethnicity before I looked more 
specifically at different research related to the topic. From the literature reviews I concluded 
that most research on the topic find that ethnicity has a negative effect on peoples willingness 
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to cooperate with each other and that ethnicity in many cases prevents and destroy collective 
actions. Concentrating on the country of interest in this research, Kenya, one observes that 
ethnic divides have been and are still very central in the Kenyan political arena with parties 
and coalitions traditionally organized along ethnic lines. Combined with the findings from the 
literature review I therefore expected to find that ethnicity would influence people’s 
willingness to contribute to the group fund negatively in the public good game, i.e., that 
people would contribute more in a homogenous game than in both the anonymous game and 
the mixed game. I further expected that priming individuals with different social identities 
would affect people’s willingness to contribute to the group fund differently, for example, that 
a person primed with national identity would be more inclined to contribute more to the group 
fund than a person primed with ethnic identity did. 
The experiment itself was conducted summer 2012, in a relative calm period of time in Kenya 
where Election Day to the upcoming presidential election was still far away. The experiment 
attempted to invoke a co-ethnic bias in two different ways; by letting the players play 
identified games where the ethnic composition of the other group members were changed and 
by the use of priming which intended to make the ethnic identity more salient, and the data 
was analyzed through statistical methods. 
The results shows somewhat surprisingly that ethnicity does not have the expected effect on 
peoples willingness to contribute to the group fund. I found no evidence from the study that 
supports that individual’s place greater weight on the utility of co-ethnics than on the utility of 
non-co-ethnics, or that individuals are more generous towards co-ethnics and that they 
contribute more to a homogenous co-ethnic group fund. Contrary to my initial expectations, 
although not statistically significant, I found that, individuals in the control group on average 
contribute more to the funding of the group fund in the mixed public good games compared to 
the homogenous public good game.  
When I looked at the effect of the different treatment primes I found that the ethnic prime 
which intended to remind subjects of cultural differences within Kenya, did not have a 
statistically significantly effect on people’s willingness to cooperate. I also experimented with 
a political competition prime, intended to capture whether political tensions make people less 
prone to cooperate. There is some evidence of increased free riding, but only in the 
anonymous public good game. Finally, I also investigated whether invoking a feeling of 
national pride would make people more willing to cooperate. Surprisingly, however, the 
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national prime tends to make people less cooperative in all games, one possible explanation 
being that the national prime made people think about what divides Kenyans (like the political 
prime) rather than what unites Kenyans. 
11.0 Conclusion 
The negative effect of ethnic preferences is striking, particularly since it is found across 
different approaches, both by comparing the different games and by priming. If the finding 
was only established by the use of the identified games people could argue that the results 
came about as an experimenter demand effect, i.e., that the participants behaved in a certain 
way because they understood what the experiment was looking at. If the finding was only 
established by the use of priming, people could argue that this only reflects that the priming 
was too weak. However, both of these arguments become less likely when the negative effect 
of ethnic preferences is found both across approaches and games.  
Based on the result and argumentation above I conclude that I do not find that ethnicity matter 
for normal people in non-political times. 
12.0 Implications 
In this research I find contrary to my main expectations that ethnicity does not matter for 
normal people in non-political times. The result indicates that one should not so easily jump 
from the observation of ethnic divides to the conclusion that there are fundamental ethnic 
preferences and beliefs that apply to all situations. In Kenya, I find that neither ethnic 
composition or ethnic priming affects peoples willingness to cooperate. For further research 
on the topic it would be interesting to look if this missing negative effect of ethnicity is only 
valid for research related to cooperation? Will one for example find similar results in other 
countries? Is so, what will this mean for the way we address ethnicity? And lastly, how will 
the result change closer to Election Day when political campaigning ramps up?  
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14.0 Appendix 
In this chapter I present the different appendices. Appendix 14.1 to 14.11 refers to different 
tests I have done in the analysis. I have chosen to present them separately in the appendix so it 
will be easy for the reader to follow what kind of test have been performed to get the different 
results. The chapter ends with appendix 14.12 who shows the dofile which includes all the 
commands I have used to produce the results.   
14.1 Test mean contribution across games.  
Between the anonymous- and mixed public good game 
. ttest contr_c = contr_comp 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 contr_c |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
contr_~p |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |     150   -2.055556    2.128335    26.06667   -6.261173    2.150061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_c - contr_comp)                      t =  -0.9658 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      149 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1679         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3357          Pr(T > t) = 0.8321 
P-value of 0.3357 indicate that the observed difference is not statistically significant. 
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Between the anonymous and homogenous  public good game  
. ttest contr_c = contr_ch 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 contr_c |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
contr_ch |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |     150   -.1888891    2.293499    28.08951   -4.720874    4.343096 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_c - contr_ch)                        t =  -0.0824 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      149 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4672         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9345          Pr(T > t) = 0.5328 
 
P-value of 0.9345 indicate that the observed difference is not statistically significant. 
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Between the mixed and the homogenous public good game 
. ttest contr_comp = contr_ch 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_~p |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
contr_ch |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |     150    1.866667    1.951176    23.89693   -1.988884    5.722217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_comp - contr_ch)                     t =   0.9567 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =      149 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8299         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3403          Pr(T > t) = 0.1701 
 
P-value of 0.3403 indicate that the observed difference is not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
14.2. Kolmogorov – Smirnov test for equality of distribution. 
In addition to compare mean contribution I want to explain the impact on overall distribution 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is a nonparametric 
test for the equality of continuous, one-dimensional probability distributions that can be used 
to compare a sample with a reference probability distribution (one-sample K–S test), or too 
compare two samples (two-sample K–S test) (Wikipedia 2014). The two-sample 
Kolomogorov-Smirnov test is one of the most useful and general nonparametric methods for 
comparing two samples, as it is sensitive to differences in both location and shape of the 
empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two samples (ibid). In the two-sample K-S 
test the null hypotheses states that the samples are drawn from the same distribution. Note that 
while the two-sample test checks whether the two data samples come from the same 
distribution, it does not specify what that common distribution is (e.g. normal or not normal). 
(Wikipedia 2014) 
Anonymous PG game vs. Mixed PG game 
ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==1 | game==2, by(game) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group            D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 1:                       0.0529    0.510 
 2:                      -0.0692    0.316 
 Combined K-S:       0.0692    0.611      0.582 
 
P-value of 0.582. The observed differences in distribution between people in the control group 
in the anonymous PG game and in the mixed PG game are not statistically significant.  
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Anonymous PG game vs. Homogenous PG game 
. ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==1 | game==3, by(game) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group             D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 1:                         0.0890    0.150 
 3:                      -0.0623    0.395 
 Combined K-S:       0.0890    0.298      0.279 
 
P-value of 0.279. The observed differences in distribution between people in the control group 
in the anonymous PG game and in the homogenous are not statistically significant.  
 
Mixed PG game vs. Homogenous PG game 
. ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==2 | game==3, by(game) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group              D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 2:                         0.0361    0.456 
 3:                       -0.0070    0.971 
 Combined K-S:       0.0361    0.827           
 
P-value of 0.827. The observed differences in distribution between people in the control group 
in the mixed PG game and in the homogenous are not statistically significant.  
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14.3 Test mean contribution for the social categories in every game.  
Anonymous PG game  
Gender 
. ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, by(gender) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Male |      71    46.71361     2.93132    24.69974    40.86728    52.55995 
  Female |      79    48.94515    2.897067     25.7497    43.17753    54.71276 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -2.231533     4.13058               -10.39407       5.931 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(Male) - mean(Female)                              t =  -0.5402 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2949         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5898          Pr(T > t) = 0.7051 
Age 
. ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom ==0 & Mix == 0, by(age_dummy) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     106    46.85534    2.440908    25.13069    42.01548    51.69521 
       1 |      44    50.37879    3.840804    25.47701    42.63307    58.12451 
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---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -3.523442    4.524958               -12.46531    5.418429 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.7787 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2187         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4374          Pr(T > t) = 0.7813 
 
Education level 
. ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, by(educ_dummy1) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      63          50    3.155344    25.04476    43.69256    56.30744 
       1 |      87    46.36015    2.717086    25.34329    40.95876    51.76154 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            3.639847    4.171937               -4.604412    11.88411 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.8725 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8078         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3844          Pr(T > t) = 0.1922 
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Mixed PG game  
Gender 
. ttest mixed if treat1, by(gender) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Male |      71    49.64789    2.926347    24.65784    43.81147     55.4843 
  Female |      79    50.21097    3.326614    29.56759    43.58819    56.83375 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -.563083    4.473495               -9.403258    8.277092 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(Male) - mean(Female)                              t =  -0.1259 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4500         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9000          Pr(T > t) = 0.5500 
 
Age 
. ttest mixed if treat1, by(age_dummy) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     106    48.97799    2.642804    27.20933    43.73779    54.21818 
       1 |      44    52.27273    4.156644    27.57206    43.89005     60.6554 
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---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -3.29474    4.898589               -12.97495    6.385471 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.6726 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2511         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5023          Pr(T > t) = 0.7489 
Education level 
. ttest mixed if treat1, by(educ_dummy1) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      63    50.92593    3.462216    27.48049    44.00505     57.8468 
       1 |      87    49.23372     2.92099    27.24518    43.42698    55.04045 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             1.69221    4.523534               -7.246847    10.63127 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.3741 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6456         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7089          Pr(T > t) = 0.3544 
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Homogenous Public-good Game 
Gender 
. ttest hom if treat1, by(gender) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Male |      71    46.52582    3.222113       27.15    40.09952    52.95212 
  Female |      79    49.47257    3.222985    28.64651     43.0561    55.88904 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -2.946752    4.570508               -11.97863    6.085131 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(Male) - mean(Female)                              t =  -0.6447 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2600         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5201          Pr(T > t) = 0.7400 
Age 
. ttest hom if treat1, by(age_dummy) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     106    47.24843    2.648791    27.27097    41.99636    52.50049 
       1 |      44    50.07576    4.457587    29.56829    41.08618    59.06534 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
84 
 
combined |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            -2.82733    5.013845                -12.7353    7.080641 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.5639 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2868         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5737          Pr(T > t) = 0.7132 
Education level 
. ttest hom if treat1, by(educ_dummy1) 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |      63    50.79365    3.763024    29.86807    43.27147    58.31583 
       1 |      87    46.11111    2.827585    26.37396    40.49006    51.73216 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |             4.68254     4.61403               -4.435349    13.80043 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.0148 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      148 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8441         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3118          Pr(T > t) = 0.1559 
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14.4 Test mean contribution for the social categories across games 
Gender; Female 
Anonymous versus mixed PG game 
. ttest contr_cf = contr_cfm 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_cf |      79    48.94515    2.897067     25.7497    43.17753    54.71276 
contr~fm |      79    50.21097    3.326614    29.56759    43.58819    56.83375 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      79   -1.265823    3.303204    29.35952   -7.841996     5.31035 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_cf - contr_cfm)                      t =  -0.3832 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       78 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.3513         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7026          Pr(T > t) = 0.6487 
 
Anonymous versus homogenous PG game 
. ttest contr_cf = contr_cfh 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_cf |      79    48.94515    2.897067     25.7497    43.17753    54.71276 
contr~fh |      79    49.47257    3.222985    28.64651     43.0561    55.88904 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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    diff |      79   -.5274261    3.494758    31.06209   -7.484956    6.430103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_cf - contr_cfh)                      t =  -0.1509 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       78 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4402         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8804          Pr(T > t) = 0.5598 
 
Mixed versus homogenous PG game 
. ttest contr_cfm = contr_cfh 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr~fm |      79    50.21097    3.326614    29.56759    43.58819    56.83375 
contr~fh |      79    49.47257    3.222985    28.64651     43.0561    55.88904 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      79    .7383966    3.170982    28.18431   -5.574544    7.051338 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_cfm - contr_cfh)                     t =   0.2329 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       78 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5918         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8165          Pr(T > t) = 0.4082 
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 Gender; Male  
Anonymous versus mixed PG game 
. ttest contr_cm = contr_cmm 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_cm |      71    46.71361     2.93132    24.69974    40.86728    52.55995 
contr~mm |      71    49.64789    2.926347    24.65784    43.81147     55.4843 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      71   -2.934273     2.61179    22.00733   -8.143323    2.274778 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(contr_cm - contr_cmm)                      t =  -1.1235 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       70 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1325         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2651          Pr(T > t) = 0.8675 
 
I used the the same procedure to compare mean for the other socio-economic categories; age 
and education level. Instead of listing all test here, which will take a lot of space, I refer to 
appendix 14.12 for a control of the result.  
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14.5 Kolmogorov –Smirnov test for equality of distribution. 
Anonymous Public-good Game. 
Gender: male versus female. 
Smaller group             D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                              0.1132    0.383 
 1:                             -0.0449    0.860 
 Combined K-S:       0.1132    0.724      0.665 
P-value of 0.665. The observed difference in distribution between male and female are not 
statistically significant. Contribution across gender has the same distribution.  
Age: age equal and below age 35 versus age above 35 
Smaller group              D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                        0.0639    0.776 
 1:                       -0.0111    0.992 
 Combined K-S:       0.0639    1.000      0.998 
P-value of 0.998. Contribution across age have the same distribution. 
Education: below median education versus above median education. 
 Smaller group              D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                                 0.0000    1.000 
 1:                                -0.2190    0.028 
 Combined K-S:          0.2190    0.055      0.045 
P-value of 0.045. Contribution across level of education do not have the same distribution.  
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Mixed Public-good Game 
Gender: female versus male 
 Smaller group          D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                        0.1107    0.400 
 1:                      -0.1054    0.436 
 Combined K-S:       0.1107    0.749      0.691 
P-value of 0.691. Contribution across gender have the same distribution. 
Age: age equal and below age 35 versus age above 35 
 Smaller group            D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                         0.0648    0.770 
 1:                         0.0000    1.000 
 Combined K-S:       0.0648    1.000      0.998 
P-value of 0.998. Contribution across age have the same distribution 
Education: below median education versus above median education. 
Smaller group             D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                        0.0075    0.996 
 1:                     -0.0759    0.650 
 Combined K-S:       0.0759    0.982      0.964 
P-value of 0.964. Contribution across level of education have the same distribution. 
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Homogenous Public -good game 
Gender: female versus male 
Smaller group            D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                       0.1164    0.363 
 1:                     -0.0585    0.774 
 Combined K-S:      0.1164    0.691      0.631 
P-value of 0.6311. Contribution across gender have the same distribution. 
Age: age equal and below age 35 versus age above 35 
 Smaller group       D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                     0.0592    0.804 
 1:                         -0.0060    0.998 
 Combined K-S:    0.0592    1.000      1.000 
P-value of 1.0. Contribution across age have the same distribution 
Education: below median education versus above median education. 
Smaller group           D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 0:                             0.0000    1.000 
 1:                            -0.0972    0.493 
 Combined K-S:       0.0972    0.871      0.829 
P-value of 0.829. Contribution across level of education have the same distribution. 
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14.6 Test if the difference between mean contribution and beliefs of others are 
equal to each 
Anonymous public good game 
ttest contr_c = contr_b, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 contr_c |     150    47.88889    2.057444    25.19844    43.82335    51.95442 
 contr_b |     150        47.3    1.533913    18.78652    44.26897    50.33103 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     300    47.59444    1.281122    22.18969    45.07329     50.1156 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .5888881    2.566313               -4.461505    5.639281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(contr_c) - mean(contr_b)                          t =   0.2295 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      298 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5907         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8187          Pr(T > t) = 0.4093 
 
P-value of 0.88 indicate that the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others 
contribution is not statistically significant, i.e. we can keep H0 that says there are no 
difference in own contribution and beliefs.  
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Mixed public good game 
ttest contr_comp = bmixo, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_~p |     150    49.94444    2.226176    27.26497    45.54549     54.3434 
   bmixo |     150    50.36667    1.825086    22.35265    46.76027    53.97306 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     300    50.15556    1.436983    24.88927    47.32767    52.98344 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.4222229     2.87868                -6.08734    5.242894 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(contr_comp) - mean(bmixo)                         t =  -0.1467 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      298 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4417         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8835          Pr(T > t) = 0.5583 
 
P-value of 0.88 indicate that the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others 
contribution is not statistically significant, i.e. we can keep H0 that says there are no 
difference in own contribution and beliefs.  
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Homogenous public good game 
ttest contr_ch = bhomo, unpaired 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
contr_ch |     150    48.07778    2.277522    27.89384    43.57736    52.57819 
   bhomo |     149    52.06935    1.936853     23.6423    48.24189    55.89681 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     299    50.06689    1.497638    25.89658     47.1196    53.01418 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -3.991574    2.991378               -9.878557    1.895409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(contr_ch) - mean(bhomo)                           t =  -1.3344 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      297 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0916         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1831          Pr(T > t) = 0.9084 
P-value of 0.18 indicate that the difference between own contribution and beliefs of others 
contribution is not statistically significant, i.e. we can keep H0 that says there are no 
difference in own contribution and beliefs.  
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14.7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution between own 
contribution and beliefs of others contribution across the different games 
 
Anonymous public good game vs. the mixed publig good game 
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & game1==1 | game1==2, by(game1) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group           D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 1:                         0.0098    0.977 
 2:                   -0.1149    0.042 
 Combined K-S:       0.1149    0.083      0.076 
P-value of 0.083 indicates that there is a difference in distribution between own contribution 
and beliefs of others between the anonymous- and the mixed public good game. The 
difference is statistically significant at a 10 percent significance level. 
Anonymous public good game vs. the homogenous public good game  
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & game1==1 | game1==3, 
by(game1) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group           D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 1:                        0.0472    0.585 
 3:                       -0.1092    0.057 
 Combined K-S:       0.1092    0.115      0.105 
P-value of 0.115 indicates that there is not a difference in distribution between own 
contribution and beliefs of others between the anonymous- and the homogenous public good 
game. 
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Mixed public good game vs. the homogenous public good game 
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & game1==2 | game1==3, 
by(game1) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 Smaller group           D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 2:                         0.0253    0.858 
 3:                       -0.1028    0.079 
 Combined K-S:       0.1028    0.158      0.146 
P-value of 0.158 indicates that there is not a difference in distribution between own 
contribution and beliefs of others between the mixed- and the homogenous public good game. 
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14.8 Comparing mean contribution for the control group for the anonymous 
versus the identified (co-ethnic) Dictator Game 
 
. ttest dictc == dictci, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dictc |     150       43.72    1.444208    17.68787    40.86623    46.57377 
  dictci |     282     41.9078    1.199396    20.14128    39.54686    44.26874 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     432    42.53704    .9296937    19.32332    40.70974    44.36433 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            1.812199    1.953096               -2.026604    5.651001 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dictc) - mean(dictci)                             t =   0.9279 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      430 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8230         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3540          Pr(T > t) = 0.1770 
The test produce a p-value of 0.3540, i.e., I do not ﬁnd that the difference in mean 
contribution for the control group is statistically significant between the anonymous and the 
identified games. 
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14.9 Comparing mean contribution for the socio-economic categories for the 
anonymous versus the identified (co-ethnic) Dictator Game 
 
Gender: females 
ttest dictf = dictfi, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dictf |      79    45.16456    2.154261    19.14749    40.87575    49.45336 
  dictfi |     149    44.42953     1.82308    22.25353     40.8269    48.03216 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     228    44.68421    1.403277    21.18902     41.9191    47.44933 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            .7350268    2.955092               -5.088029    6.558083 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dictf) - mean(dictfi)                             t =   0.2487 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      226 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5981         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8038          Pr(T > t) = 0.4019 
P-value of 0.8 indicates that the difference in mean contribution for females in the anonymous 
dictator game compared to the identified dictator game is far from being statistically 
significant. I find no evidence that females behave differently in these two games.  
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Gender; males 
ttest dictm = dictmi, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   dictm |      71    42.11268    1.885617    15.88849    38.35193    45.87342 
  dictmi |     133    39.08271    1.484562     17.1208     36.1461    42.01932 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     204    40.13725    1.171024    16.72557    37.82832    42.44618 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            3.029969    2.455173               -1.811086    7.871025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dictm) - mean(dictmi)                             t =   1.2341 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      202 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8907         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2186          Pr(T > t) = 0.1093 
P-value of 0.22 indicates that the difference in mean contribution for males in the anonymous 
dictator game compared to the identified dictator game is not statistically significant. I find no 
evidence that males behave differently in these two games.  
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Age: age equal or below 35 
-no observations for the identified games 
Age: age above 35 
ttest dictapluss = dictaplussi, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dictap~s |      44    44.13636    2.565339    17.01653    38.96286    49.30986 
dictap~i |     282     41.9078    1.199396    20.14128    39.54686    44.26874 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     326    42.20859    1.093262    19.73936    40.05782    44.35935 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            2.228562    3.202107               -4.070984    8.528109 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dictapluss) - mean(dictaplussi)                   t =   0.6960 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      324 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.7565         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4869          Pr(T > t) = 0.2435 
P-value of 0.487 indicates that the difference in mean contribution for people aged 35 or 
below in the anonymous dictator game compared to the identified dictator game is far from 
being statistically significant. I find no evidence that people in this age group behave 
differently in these two games.  
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Education: below median education 
ttest dictedul = dicteduli, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dictedul |      63    43.61905    2.747193    21.80517    38.12749    49.11061 
dicte~li |     118    44.15254    2.119993    23.02901    39.95401    48.35108 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     181    43.96685    1.676214    22.55115    40.65929    47.27441 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.5334948    3.528408               -7.496121    6.429131 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dictedul) - mean(dicteduli)                       t =  -0.1512 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      179 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4400         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8800          Pr(T > t) = 0.5600 
P-value of 0.8 indicates that the difference in mean contribution for people with below median 
education in the anonymous dictator game compared to the identified dictator game is far 
from being statistically significant. I find no evidence that people who have below median 
education behave differently in these two games.  
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Education: above median education 
ttest dicteduh = dicteduhi, unpaired 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dicteduh |      87     43.7931    1.513385    14.11591    40.78459    46.80161 
dicte~hi |     164    40.29268    1.380183    17.67497    37.56734    43.01803 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     251    41.50598    1.046754     16.5837     39.4444    43.56756 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |            3.500421    2.192784               -.8183494     7.81919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(dicteduh) - mean(dicteduhi)                       t =   1.5963 
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      249 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9442         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1117          Pr(T > t) = 0.0558 
P-value of 0.11 indicates that the difference in mean contribution for people with above 
median education in the anonymous dictator game compared to the identified dictator game is 
close to beiing statistically significant.  
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14.10 Comparing distribution for the control group when the different treatments 
are included 
This test is very comprehensive. In this appendix, I only show the procedure for how I have 
performed the test with one example from the anonymous game; the control group vs. 
national identity treatment prime. The set-up for the mixed – and homogenous public good 
game are similar to the set up for the anonymous public good game. As I include the do-file I 
do not show all tests here, but I refer to appendix  14.12 for a full overview and to see that the 
tests have been performed.  
Anonymous public good game 
Control group vs. national identity treatment prime 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
 
Smaller group         D       P-value      Exact 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
 Control:                0.0468    0.609 
 National Prime:    -0.1125    0.057 
 Combined K-S:       0.1125    0.115      0.105 
 
P-value of 0.115 indicates that the difference in distribution between the control group and the 
group treated with national identity prime are not statistically significant. The difference in 
distribution is not huge enough to conclude that the histogram for the people in the control 
group are different than for people treated with the national identity prime. 
Control group vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
Control group vs. political competition treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
Ethnic identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
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Appendix 14.11 Comparing distribution for the different socio-economic 
categories when the different treatments are included 
This test is very comprehensive and follows the same structure as the test above. The only 
difference is that I also look at each socio-economic variable separately. In this appendix, I 
only show the procedure for how I have performed the test. The set-up for the mixed – and 
homogenous public good game are similar to the set up for the anonymous public good game. 
As I the dofile in the appendix I do not show any tests here, but I refer to appendix 14.12 for a 
full overview and control that the test have been performed.  
Anonymous game 
Females 
Control group vs. national identity treatment prime 
Control group vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
Control group vs. political competition treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
Ethnic identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
 
Males  
Control group vs. national identity treatment prime 
Control group vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
Control group vs. political competition treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. ethnic identity treatment prime 
National identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
Ethnic identity treatment prime vs. political competition treatment prime 
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14.12 Commands used in Stata to produce the result – dofile 
 
clear 
set mem 50m 
cap log close 
 
cd "C:\Users\OP\Desktop\Data\" 
log using Master.txt, text replace 
 
/*PUBLIC GOOD GAME*/ 
* Load data into memory 
use public.dta 
 
/*PART I OF THE ANALYSIS*/ 
 
/******************** Summary statistics for the control group 
*********************/ 
 
/* Note: In the anonymous PG game, mean contribution are already 
transformed to percent in the original dataset. For the mixed-   
and homogenous PG game i have to transform the result to percent as 
this was not given */ 
 
 
/********** Anonymous PG game **********/ 
gen contr_c = pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_cf = pg_contr if treat1 & female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_cm = pg_contr if treat1 & !female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_c35 = pg_contr if treat1 & age_rc <= 35 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_c35pluss = pg_contr if treat1 & age_rc > 35 & Hom == 0 & Mix 
== 0 
gen contr_cedul = pg_contr if treat1 & educ_dm < 0 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 
0 
gen contr_ceduh = pg_contr if treat1 & educ_dm > 0 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 
0 
 
label variable contr_c "Overall" 
label variable contr_cf "Female" 
label variable contr_cm "Male" 
label variable contr_c35 "Age: 35 and under"  
label variable contr_c35pluss "Age: over 35" 
label variable contr_cedul "Below Median Education" 
label variable contr_ceduh "Above Median Education" 
 
 
estpost tabstat contr_c contr_cf contr_cm contr_c35 contr_c35pluss 
contr_cedul contr_ceduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Contribution 
 
 
/************* Mixed PG game *************/ 
gen contr_comp = pgidmix_contribution if treat1  
gen contr_cfm = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & female 
gen contr_cmm = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & !female 
gen contr_c35m = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & age_rc <= 35 
gen contr_c35plussm = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & age_rc > 35 
gen contr_cedulm = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & educ_dm < 0 
gen contr_ceduhm = pgidmix_contribution if treat1 & educ_dm > 0 
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/* transform to percent*/ 
replace contr_comp = (100 * contr_comp)/ 60 
replace contr_cfm = (100 * contr_cfm) / 60 
replace contr_cmm = (100 * contr_cmm) / 60 
replace contr_c35m = (100 * contr_c35m) / 60 
replace contr_c35plussm = (100 * contr_c35plussm) / 60 
replace contr_cedulm = (100 * contr_cedulm) / 60 
replace contr_ceduhm = (100 * contr_ceduhm) / 60 
 
label variable contr_comp "Overall" 
label variable contr_cfm "Female" 
label variable contr_cmm "Male" 
label variable contr_c35m "Age: 35 and under"  
label variable contr_c35plussm "Age: over 35" 
label variable contr_cedulm "Below Median Education" 
label variable contr_ceduhm "Above Median Education" 
 
 
estpost tabstat contr_comp contr_cfm contr_cmm contr_c35m 
contr_c35plussm contr_cedulm contr_ceduhm, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Contributionm 
 
 
/************* Homogenous PG game ***************/ 
gen contr_ch = pgidhom_contribution if treat1  
gen contr_cfh = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & female  
gen contr_cmh = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & !female  
gen contr_c35h = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & age_rc <= 35  
gen contr_c35plussh = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & age_rc > 35  
gen contr_cedulh = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & educ_dm < 0  
gen contr_ceduhh = pgidhom_contribution if treat1 & educ_dm > 0  
 
/* transform to percent*/ 
replace contr_ch = (100 * contr_ch)/ 60 
replace contr_cfh = (100 * contr_cfh) / 60 
replace contr_cmh = (100 * contr_cmh) / 60 
replace contr_c35h = (100 * contr_c35h) / 60 
replace contr_c35plussh = (100 * contr_c35plussh) / 60 
replace contr_cedulh = (100 * contr_cedulh) / 60 
replace contr_ceduhh = (100 * contr_ceduhh) / 60 
 
 
label variable contr_ch "Overall" 
label variable contr_cfh "Female" 
label variable contr_cmh "Male" 
label variable contr_c35h "Age: 35 and under"  
label variable contr_c35plussh "Age: over 35" 
label variable contr_cedulh "Below Median Education" 
label variable contr_ceduhh "Above Median Education" 
 
 
estpost tabstat contr_ch contr_cfh contr_cmh contr_c35h contr_c35plussh 
contr_cedulh contr_ceduhh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Contributionh 
 
esttab Contribution Contributionm Contributionh using Table1.rtf, 
replace label title(Table 1. Public good Game: summary statistics for 
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the control group) main(mean) aux(sd) nostar mtitle(Anonymous "Mixed 
PG" "Homogenous")  
 
/*** Test if mean contribution are equal across games for the control 
group ***/ 
/* Control group, overall */ 
ttest contr_c = contr_comp 
ttest contr_c = contr_ch 
ttest contr_comp = contr_ch 
 
/*** Distribution for the control group,overall, across game ***/ 
hist contr_c, percent title (Anonymous PG Game) subtitle (Control 
group) 
graph export Anonymous.wmf, replace 
hist contr_comp, percent title (Mixed PG Game) subtitle (Control group) 
graph export Mixed.wmf, replace 
hist contr_ch, percent title (Homogenous PG Game) subtitle (Control 
group) 
graph export Homogenous.wmf, replace 
 
/* I have created a new variable that distinguish the three different 
games from each other  
to use in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov; equality of distribution test */ 
gen game= . 
replace game = 1 if (Mix==0 & Hom==0) 
replace game = 2 if (Mix==1) 
replace game = 3 if (Hom==1) 
 
/* Control if I have made a correct division of the games */ 
tabulate game 
 
/* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality of dstribution */ 
/* Anonymous PG game vs Mixed PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==1 | game==2, by(game) exact 
 
/* Anonymous PG game vs Homogenous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==1 | game==3, by(game) exact 
 
/* Mixed PG game vs Homogenous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if treat1 & game==2 | game==3, by(game) exact 
 
 
/**************** SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES ************/ 
 
/*Create two variables that give me contribution in the mixed PG and 
the homogenous PG game  
in percent instead of in money value to use in the analysis*/  
gen mixed = (pgidmix_contribution * 100)/60 
gen hom = (pgidhom_contribution * 100)/60 
 
/* Regression socio-economic variables */ 
/*********** Anonymous Public-good Game *********/ 
eststo: reg pg_contr female age_rc educ_dm if Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 & 
treat1 
est store Anonymous 
/*********** Mixed Public-good Game *************/ 
eststo: reg mixed female age_rc educ_dm if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & 
T_eth == 0 
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est store Mixed 
/*********** Homogenous Public-good Game ********/ 
eststo: reg hom female age_rc educ_dm if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth 
== 0 
est store Homogenous 
 
esttab Anonymous Mixed Homogenous using Table2.rtf, label title("Table 
2. Public good Game: Socio-economic categories in the control group") 
star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) mtitle("Anonymous PG game" "Mixed PG 
game" "Homogenous Pg game") se replace 
eststo clear 
 
/* Test if mean contributions for the socio-economic categories are 
equal to one another in each game */ 
gen age_dummy = (age_rc > 35)  
gen educ_dummy1 = (educ_dm > 0.0059279) 
/* Note: 0.0059279 is the median for educ_dm, which the tables is based 
upon. I therefore have  
to use educ_dummy1 in my calculations instead of educ_dummy from the 
dataset */ 
 
/* Anonymous PG game */ 
ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, by(gender) 
ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom ==0 & Mix == 0, by(age_dummy) 
ttest pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, by(educ_dummy1) 
/* Mixed PG game */ 
ttest mixed if treat1, by(gender) 
ttest mixed if treat1, by(age_dummy) 
ttest mixed if treat1, by(educ_dummy1) 
/* Homogenous PG game */ 
ttest hom if treat1, by(gender) 
ttest hom if treat1, by(age_dummy) 
ttest hom if treat1, by(educ_dummy1) 
 
/*Test if mean contribution for the socio-economic variables are equal 
across games*/ 
/* Females */ 
ttest contr_cf = contr_cfm 
ttest contr_cf = contr_cfh 
ttest contr_cfm = contr_cfh 
/* Males */ 
ttest contr_cm = contr_cmm 
ttest contr_cm = contr_cmh 
ttest contr_cmm = contr_cmh 
/* Age <= 35 */ 
ttest contr_c35 = contr_c35m 
ttest contr_c35 = contr_c35h 
ttest contr_c35m = contr_c35h 
/* Age > 35 */ 
ttest contr_c35pluss = contr_c35plussm 
ttest contr_c35pluss = contr_c35plussh 
ttest contr_c35plussm = contr_c35plussh 
/* Education_dm < 0 */ 
ttest contr_cedul = contr_cedulm 
ttest contr_cedul = contr_cedulh 
ttest contr_cedulm = contr_cedulh 
/* Education_dm > 0 */ 
ttest contr_ceduh = contr_ceduhm 
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ttest contr_ceduh = contr_ceduhh 
ttest contr_ceduhm = contr_ceduhh 
 
 
 
/********* Distribution for the socio economic variables in the 
different games **********/ 
/* Anonymous PG game */ 
hist pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, percent by(female) title 
("Gender, Male, Female") 
graph export AnonymousGender.wmf, replace 
hist pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, percent by(age_dummy) 
title ("Age, Age =< 35, Age > 35") 
graph export AnonymousAge.wmf, replace 
hist pg_contr if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, percent by(educ_dummy) 
title ("Education, Below medidan education, Above median education") 
graph export AnonymousEducation.wmf, replace 
/*Mixed PG Game ***************/ 
hist mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent by(female) 
title (Gender) 
graph export MixedGender.wmf, replace 
hist mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent 
by(age_dummy) title (Age) 
graph export MixedAge.wmf, replace 
hist mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent 
by(educ_dummy) title (Education) 
graph export MixedEducation.wmf, replace 
/* Homogenous PG Game*/ 
hist hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent by(female) 
title (Gender) 
graph export HomogenousGender.wmf, replace 
hist hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent by(age_dummy) 
title (Age) 
graph export HomogenousAge.wmf, replace 
hist hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, percent by(educ_dummy) 
title (Education) 
graph export HomogenousEducation.wmf, replace 
 
/* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, test if distributions are equal for the 
socio-economic variables*/ 
/***Anonymous public good game***/ 
/*Gender*/ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix == 0 & Hom == 0 & treat1, by(female) exact 
/*Age*/ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix == 0 & Hom == 0 & treat1, by(age_dummy) exact 
/*Education*/ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix == 0 & Hom == 0 & treat1, by(educ_dummy) exact 
/*** Mixed public good game***/ 
/*Gender*/ 
ksmirnov mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(female) exact 
/*Age*/ 
ksmirnov mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(age_dummy) 
exact 
/*Education*/ 
ksmirnov mixed if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(educ_dummy) 
exact 
/***Homogenpus public good game** */ 
/*Gender*/ 
109 
 
ksmirnov hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(female) exact 
/*Age*/ 
ksmirnov hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(age_dummy) 
exact 
/*Education*/ 
ksmirnov hom if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & T_eth == 0, by(educ_dummy) 
exact 
 
/* Note: for figure 5, 6 & 7 I had to edit the graphs manually in stata 
editor so that for example 0 and 1  
in the gender caterogy was transformed to male and female, 0 and 1 in 
tha age category to age=<35 and age > 35  
respectively and for the education category 0 to below median education 
and 1 to above median education, making it  
more understandable for the reader*/ 
 
 
 
/*************** Robustness checks, control for the above findings 
***************/ 
 
/* Regression "contribution below 50%" */ 
/* Anonymous PG game */ 
gen pg_contrlow = pg_contr < 50 
eststo: reg pg_contrlow female age_rc educ_dm if treat1 & Hom == 0 & 
Mix == 0 
est store Anonbelow 
/* Mixed PG game */ 
gen mixedlow = mixed < 50 
eststo: reg mixedlow female age_rc educ_dm if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & 
T_eth == 0 
est store Mixedbelow 
/* Homogenous PG game */ 
gen homlow = hom < 50 
eststo: reg homlow female age_rc educ_dm if T_nat == 0 & T_pc == 0 & 
T_eth == 0 
est store Homlow 
 
esttab Anonbelow Mixedbelow Homlow using Table3.rtf, label title("Table 
3. Public Good-game: Contribution below 50%")star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 
0.01) mtitle("Anonymous PG game" "Mixed PG game" "Homogenous PG game") 
se replace 
eststo clear 
 
 
/*PART II OF THE ANALYSIS*/ 
 
/************** Anonymous Public Good Game *****************/ 
/******************** Contribution*********************/ 
estpost tabstat contr_c contr_cf contr_cm contr_c35 contr_c35pluss 
contr_cedul contr_ceduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Contribution 
 
 
/**********Beliefs about others contribution************/ 
gen contr_b = pg_belief_av if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_bf = pg_belief_av if treat1 & female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen contr_bm = pg_belief_av if treat1 & !female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
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gen contr_b35 = pg_belief_av if treat1 & age_rc <= 35 & Hom == 0 & Mix 
== 0 
gen contr_b35pluss = pg_belief_av if treat1 & age_rc > 35 & Hom == 0 & 
Mix == 0 
gen contr_bedul = pg_belief_av if treat1 & educ_dm < 0 & Hom == 0 & Mix 
== 0 
gen contr_beduh = pg_belief_av if treat1 & educ_dm > 0 & Hom == 0 & Mix 
== 0 
 
label variable contr_b "Overall" 
label variable contr_bf "Female" 
label variable contr_bm "Male" 
label variable contr_b35 "Age: 35 and under"  
label variable contr_b35pluss "Age: over 35" 
label variable contr_bedul "Below Median Education" 
label variable contr_beduh "Above Median Education" 
 
estpost tabstat contr_b contr_bf contr_bm contr_b35 contr_b35pluss 
contr_bedul contr_beduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Belief 
 
/************ Beliefs - contribution ************/ 
gen diffcb = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
gen difff = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 
0 
gen diffm = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & !female & Hom == 0 & Mix == 
0 
gen diff35 = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & age_rc <= 35 & Hom == 0 & 
Mix == 0 
gen diff35pluss = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & age_rc > 35 & Hom == 
0 & Mix == 0 
gen diffedul = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & educ_dm < 0 & Hom == 0 & 
Mix == 0 
gen diffeduh = pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & educ_dm > 0 & Hom == 0 & 
Mix == 0 
 
label variable diffcb "Overall" 
label variable difff "Female" 
label variable diffm "Male" 
label variable diff35 "Age: 35 and under"  
label variable diff35pluss "Age: over 35" 
label variable diffedul "Below Median Education" 
label variable diffeduh "Above Median Education" 
 
estpost tabstat diffcb difff diffm diff35 diff35pluss diffedul 
diffeduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Beliefs 
 
esttab Contribution Belief Beliefs using Table4021.rtf, replace label 
title("Table 14: Anonymous Public-good Game: summary statistics for the 
control group") main(mean) aux(sd) nostar mtitle(Contribution "Belief" 
"Beliefs")  
 
  
/***************** Mixed Public Good Game ********************/ 
/***** Contribution ******/ 
estpost tabstat contr_comp contr_cfm contr_cmm contr_c35m 
contr_c35plussm contr_cedulm contr_ceduhm, s(mean sd) column(s) 
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est store Contributionm 
 
/***** Beliefs of others contribution *****/ 
gen bmixo = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
gen bmixf = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
female 
gen bmixm = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
!female 
gen bmix35 = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
& age_rc <= 35 
gen bmix35pluss = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & age_rc > 35 
gen bmixedul = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & educ_dm < 0 
gen bmixeduh = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & educ_dm > 0 
 
estpost tabstat bmixo bmixf bmixm bmix35 bmix35pluss bmixedul bmixeduh, 
s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Beliefm 
 
/******* Contribution - beliefs *******/ 
gen mdiffo = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 
gen mdifff = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & female 
gen mdiffm = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & !female 
gen mdiffa = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & age_rc <= 35 
gen mdiffapluss = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & 
T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & age_rc > 35 
gen mdiffedul = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & educ_dm < 0 
gen mdiffeduh = pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & educ_dm > 0 
 
estpost tabstat mdiffo mdifff mdiffm mdiffa mdiffapluss mdiffedul 
mdiffeduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Diffm 
 
esttab Contributionm Beliefm Diffm using Table4.rtf, replace label 
title("Table 15: Mixed Public-good Game: summary statistics for the 
control group") main(mean) aux(sd) nostar mtitle(Contribution "Belief" 
"Beliefs") 
 
/*NOTE: Missing variables for age in table 14. Missing age_rc <= 35 & 
age__rc>35 in table 15, I find this variable and include it manually in 
the table*/ 
gen beliefmix = ((pgmixbeliefa + pgmixbeliefb)/2) 
gen beliefm = beliefmix/60 *100 
gen beliefma = beliefm if age_rc<=35 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
gen beliefapluss = beliefm if age_rc>35 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 
sum beliefma 
sum beliefapluss 
 
gen diffa = bmix35 - beliefma 
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sum diffa  
 
sum pg_contr_min_belief if Mix == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
age_rc <= 35 
 
/************* Homogenous public Good Game *******************/ 
/******** Contribution ********/ 
estpost tabstat contr_ch contr_cfh contr_cmh contr_c35h contr_c35plussh 
contr_cedulh contr_ceduhh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Contributionh 
 
/******** Beliefs of others contribution **********/ 
gen bhomo = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
gen bhomf = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
female 
gen bhomm = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
!female 
gen bhom35 = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
& age_rc <= 35 
gen bhom35pluss = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & age_rc > 35 
gen bhomedul = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & educ_dm < 0 
gen bmhomeduh = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & educ_dummy > 0 
 
estpost tabstat bhomo bhomf bhomm bhom35 bhom35pluss bhomedul 
bmhomeduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Beliefh 
 
/******* Contribution - beliefs *******/ 
gen hdiffo = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 
gen hdifff = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & female 
gen hdiffm = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & !female 
gen hdiffa = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & age_rc <= 35 
gen hdiffapluss = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & 
T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & age_rc > 35 
gen hdiffedul = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & educ_dm < 0 
gen hdiffeduh = pg_contr_min_belief if Hom == 1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & educ_dm > 0 
 
estpost tabstat hdiffo hdifff hdiffm hdiffa hdiffapluss hdiffedul 
hdiffeduh, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Diffh 
 
esttab Contributionh Beliefh Diffh using Table4019.rtf, replace label 
title("Table 16: Homogenous Public-good Game: summary statistics for 
the control group") main(mean) aux(sd) nostar mtitle(Contribution 
"Belief" "Beliefs") 
 
/*Missing age_rc <= 35 in table 16, I find this variable and include it 
manually in the table*/ 
gen beliefhom = ((pghombeliefa + pghombeliefb)/2) 
113 
 
gen beliefh = beliefhom/60 *100 
sum beliefh if age_rc<=35 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
 
/* Test if the difference in mean contribution and beliefs of ohters 
contribution is statistically significant */ 
/*Anonymous public good game*/ 
ttest contr_c = contr_b, unpaired 
/*Mixed public good game*/ 
ttest contr_comp = bmixo, unpaired  
/*Homogenous public good game*/ 
ttest contr_ch = bhomo, unpaired 
 
/* Distribution - difference between own contribution and beliefs of 
others contribution" */ 
histogram pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & Mix==0 & Hom==0, percent 
title("Anonymous PG Game") subtitle("Control") 
graph export Contributionbeliefanon.wmf, replace 
histogram pg_contr_min_belief if Mix==1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0, percent title("Mixed PG Game") subtitle("Control") 
graph export Contributionbeliefmix.wmf, replace 
histogram pg_contr_min_belief if Hom==1 & T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0, percent title("Homogenous PG Game") subtitle("Control") 
graph export Contributionbeliefhom.wmf, replace 
 
 
/* I have created a new variable that distinguish the three different 
games from each other  
to use in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality of distribution */ 
gen game1= . 
replace game1 = 1 if (Mix==0 & Hom==0) 
replace game1 = 2 if (Mix==1) 
replace game1 = 3 if (Hom==1) 
 
/* Control if I have made a correct division of the games */ 
tabulate game1 
 
/* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality of dstribution */ 
/* Anonymous PG game vs Mixed PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if treat1 & game1==1 | game1==2, by(game1) 
exact 
/* Anonymous PG game vs Homogenous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
game1==1 | game1==3, by(game1) exact 
/* Mixed PG game vs Homogenous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr_min_belief if T_nat ==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
game1==2 | game1==3, by(game1) exact 
 
 
/*  DICTATOR GAME */ 
clear  
/* In this analysis i need to use another dataset*/ 
use "dictator game.dta" 
 
/* Control group, summary statistics for the Anonymous Game */ 
gen dictc = dg_transfer if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
gen dictf = dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & 
CE_dg == 0 
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gen dictm = dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & 
CE_dg == 0 
gen dicta = dg_transfer if age_rc <= 35 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 
0 & CE_dg == 0 
gen dictapluss = dg_transfer if age_rc > 35 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
gen dictedul = dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
gen dicteduh = dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
 
label variable dictc "Control" 
label variable dictf "Female" 
label variable dictm "Male" 
label variable dicta "Age equal or below 35" 
label variable dictapluss "Age above 35" 
label variable dictedul "Under Median Education" 
label variable dicteduh "Above Median Education" 
 
estpost tabstat dictc dictf dictm dicta dictapluss dictedul dicteduh, 
s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Dictatoranon 
 
/* Control group, summary statistics for Identified Games */ 
gen dictci = dg_transfer if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 1 
gen dictfi = dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & 
CE_dg == 1 
gen dictmi = dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 0 & 
CE_dg == 1 
gen dictai = dg_transfer if age_rc <= 35 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc== 
0 & CE_dg == 1 
gen dictaplussi = dg_transfer if age_rc > 35 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 1 
gen dicteduli = dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 1 
gen dicteduhi = dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc== 0 & CE_dg == 1 
 
label variable dictci "Control" 
label variable dictfi "Female" 
label variable dictmi "Male" 
label variable dictai "Age equal or below 35" 
label variable dictaplussi "Age above 35" 
label variable dicteduli "Under Median Education" 
label variable dicteduhi "Above Median Education" 
 
estpost tabstat dictci dictfi dictmi dictai dictaplussi dicteduli 
dicteduhi, s(mean sd) column(s) 
est store Dictatoridentified 
 
esttab Dictatoranon Dictatoridentified using Table7.rtf, replace label 
title("Table 4. Dictator Game: Average transfers") main(mean)aux(sd) 
nostar mtitle("Anonymous" "Co-ethnic")  
est store clear 
 
/* Test if mean transfer are different across games */ 
/* Note, I have excluded "age equal or below 35" because of no 
observation in the identified game*/ 
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/* Control group */ 
ttest dictc = dictci, unpaired 
/* Female */ 
ttest dictf = dictfi, unpaired 
/* Male */ 
ttest dictm = dictmi, unpaired 
/* Age above 35 */ 
ttest dictapluss = dictaplussi, unpaired 
/* Below median education */ 
ttest dictedul = dicteduli, unpaired 
/* Above median education */ 
ttest dicteduh = dicteduhi, unpaired 
 
/* Effect of socio-economic variables on transfer */ 
eststo: reg dictc female age_rc educ_dm 
est store Anondg 
eststo: reg dictci female educ_dm 
est store Homdg 
 
esttab Anondg Homdg using Table8.rtf, label title("Table 5. Dictator 
game: Generostiy")star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) mtitle("Anonymous DG 
game" "Identified DG game") se replace 
est store clear 
 
/**** CORRELATION****/ 
/*To test for correlation between transfer in the DG and contribution 
in the PG  
I had to merge data from the public-good game and the dictator game*/ 
clear 
use MergeKenya1.dta 
 
/*Public good game vs Dictator game*/ 
/*Note. As part II of the analysis tries to explain the results from 
Part I only focus on correlation in the control group */ 
 
/* Dictator game vs Public-good game*/ 
graph twoway scatter pg_contr dg_transfer if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0, title(Public good game vs Dictator game)  
graph export ComparingPGDG.wmf, replace  
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 
 
/* Anonymous games*/ 
graph twoway scatter pg_contr dg_transfer if Mix==0 & Hom== 0 & CE_dg 
== 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0, title(Anonymous game: PG vs DG) 
graph export ComparingAnon.wmf, replace 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & CE_dg == 0 & T_nat==0 & 
T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Mix==0 & Hom== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Mix==0 & Hom== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
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corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & Mix==0 & Hom== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & Mix==0 & Hom== 0 & CE_dg == 0 
/*Identfied games*/ 
/*Mixed*/ 
graph twoway scatter pg_contr dg_transfer if Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 & 
T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0, title(Identified game(mixed): PG vs DG) 
graph export Comparingmix.wmf, replace 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & 
T_pc==0 & Mix==1 & CE_dg == 1 
/*Homogenous*/ 
graph twoway scatter pg_contr dg_transfer if Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 & 
T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0, title(Identified game(homogenous): PG vs 
DG) 
graph export Comparingom.wmf, replace 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if !female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & 
Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm > 0 & female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 
corr pg_contr dg_transfer if educ_dm < 0 & female & T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 
& T_pc==0 & Hom==1 & CE_dg == 1 
 
/*REGRESSIONS*/ 
gen dg_transfer_fem = dg_transfer*female 
gen dg_transfer_edu = dg_transfer*educ_dm 
 
eststo: reg pg_contr female educ_dm dg_transfer dg_transfer_fem 
dg_transfer_edu if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 
est store Public 
eststo: reg pg_contr female educ_dm dg_transfer dg_transfer_fem 
dg_transfer_edu if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
CE_dg==0 
est store AnonymousPGDG 
eststo: reg pg_contr female educ_dm dg_transfer dg_transfer_fem 
dg_transfer_edu if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & Mix==1 & CE_dg==1 
est store Identified1 
eststo: reg pg_contr female educ_dm dg_transfer dg_transfer_fem 
dg_transfer_edu if T_nat==0 & T_eth==0 & T_pc==0 & Hom==0 & CE_dg==1 
est store Identified2 
 
esttab Public AnonymousPGDG Identified1 Identified2 using Table21.rtf, 
label title("Table 6. Public good game: summary statistics when 
transfer in dictator game is included") star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) 
mtitle("Overall" "Anonymous game" "Identified game 1" "Identified game 
2") se replace 
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eststo clear 
 
 
/* PART III OF THE ANALYSIS */ 
/** - focuses on the effect of priming **/ 
clear 
use "public.dta" 
 
/******************* Effect of priming *******************/ 
gen mixed = (pgidmix_contribution * 100)/60 
gen hom = (pgidhom_contribution * 100)/60 
 
eststo: reg pg_contr T_nat T_eth T_pc if Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
est store PrimingAnon 
eststo:reg mixed T_nat T_eth T_pc  
est store PrimingMix 
eststo:reg hom T_nat T_eth T_pc 
est store PrimingHom 
 
esttab PrimingAnon PrimingMix PrimingHom using Table10.rtf, label 
title("Table 7. Public-Good game, effect of priming") star(* 0.10 ** 
0.05 *** 0.01) mtitle("Anonymous PG game" "Mixed PG game" "Homogenous 
Pg game") se replace 
eststo clear 
 
/*Distribution*/ 
hist pg_contr if Hom == 0 & Mix == 0, percent by(treatment) 
title(Anonymous) 
graph export PrimingAnonymous.wmf, replace 
hist mixed, percent by(treatment) title(Mixed) 
graph export PrimingMixed.wmf, replace 
hist hom, percent by(treatment) title(Homogenous) 
graph export PrimingHomogenous.wmf, replace 
 
/* In the data, the different treatments are identified from 0-3, where 
treatment =0 is the control group, tretament= 1 is national identiy 
prime,  
treatment=2 is ethnic identity prime and tretament=3 is political 
competition prime*/ 
tabulate treatment 
/* Test if the different treatments affect distribution equally */ 
/* Anonymous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if Mix==0 & Hom==0 & treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/*Socio-economic categories*/ 
/*Female*/ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
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ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/*Male*/ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if !female & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Age equal or below 35 */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc <= 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Age above 35 */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if age_rc > 35 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education below median */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
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ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm < 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education above median */ 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pg_contr if educ_dm > 0 & Mix==0 & Hom==0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
 
/* Mixed PG game */ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/*Socio-economic categories*/ 
/*Female*/ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if female & treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/*Male*/ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if !female & treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
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/* Age equal or below 35 */ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Age above 35 */ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education below median */ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education above median */ 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidmix_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
 
/* Homogenous PG game */ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
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ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/*Socio-economic categories*/ 
/*Female*/ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if female & treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/*Male*/ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==1, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==0|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==1|treatment==2, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==1|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if !female & treatment==2|treatment==3, 
by(treatment) exact 
/* Age equal or below 35 */ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc <= 35 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Age above 35 */ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
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ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if age_rc > 35 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education below median */ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm < 0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
/* Education above median */ 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==1, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==0|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==2, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==1|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
ksmirnov pgidhom_contribution if educ_dm > 0 & 
treatment==2|treatment==3, by(treatment) exact 
 
 
/*** Robustness ***/ 
/* Contribution equals zero*/ 
gen contr0 = pg_contr == 0 
label variable contr0 "Contribution equals zero" 
gen contr0m = pgidmix_contribution == 0 
label variable contr0m "Contribution equals zero" 
gen contr0h = pgidhom_contribution == 0 
label variable contr0h "Contribution equals zero" 
 
eststo:reg contr0 T_nat T_eth T_pc if Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
est store Anon0 
eststo:reg contr0m T_nat T_eth T_pc 
est store Mix0 
eststo:reg contr0h T_nat T_eth T_pc 
est store Hom0 
 
esttab Anon0 Mix0 Hom0 using Table11.rtf, label title("Table 8. Effect 
of priming: Conrtibution equals 0.") mtitle ("Anonymous" "Mixed" 
"Homogenous") star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) order(T_nat T_eth T_pc) se 
replace 
est store clear 
 
/* Beliefs of others contribution */ 
eststo:reg pg_belief_av T_nat T_eth T_pc if Hom == 0 & Mix == 0 
est store Anonbel 
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gen belmixx = pg_belief_av if Mix == 1  
gen belhomm = pg_belief_av if Hom == 1  
 
eststo: reg belmixx T_nat T_eth T_pc 
est store Mixbel 
 
eststo: reg belhomm T_nat T_eth T_pc 
est store Hombel 
 
esttab Anonbel Mixbel Hombel using Table14.rtf, label title("Table 9. 
Beliefs of other`s contribution") mtitle ("Anonymous" "Mixed" 
"Homogenous") star(* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01) order(T_nat T_eth T_pc) se 
replace   
eststo clear 
 
/* Differenc Contribution - belief`s of others contribution */ 
eststo: reg pg_contr_min_belief T_nat T_eth T_pc if Mix==0 & Hom==0 
est store diffAnon 
eststo: reg pg_contr_min_belief T_nat T_eth T_pc if Mix==1 
est store diffMix 
eststo:reg pg_contr_min_belief T_nat T_eth T_pc if Hom == 1 
est store diffHom 
 
esttab diffAnon diffMix diffHom using Table15.rtf, label title("Table 
10. Difference between own contribution and beleif`s of others 
contribution") mtitle ("Anonymous" "Mixed" "Homogenous") star(* 0.10 ** 
0.05 *** 0.01) order(T_nat T_eth T_pc) se replace   
eststo clear 
 
clear 
cap log close 
 
